Dartmouth College as a Civil Liberties Case: The Formation of Constitutional Policy by Campbell, Bruce A.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 70 | Issue 3 Article 4
1982
Dartmouth College as a Civil Liberties Case: The
Formation of Constitutional Policy
Bruce A. Campbell
University of Toledo
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Campbell, Bruce A. (1982) "Dartmouth College as a Civil Liberties Case: The Formation of Constitutional Policy," Kentucky Law
Journal: Vol. 70 : Iss. 3 , Article 4.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol70/iss3/4
Dartmouth College as a Civil Liberties
Case: The Formation
of Constitutional Policy
BY BRUCE A. CAMPBELL*
INTRODUCTION
In 1819, the United States Supreme Court announced its de-
cision in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward. I In his
opinion for the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall set forth what
has come to be known as the Dartmouth College doctrine, the
rule that a charter of a private corporation is a contract protected
by the contracts clause of the federal Constitution2 from arbi-
trary state legislative amendment or repeal.
The case arose from an attempt by the New Hampshire legis-
lature to amend the charter of Dartmouth College.3 The College
o Associate Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Student Affairs, University of
Toledo College of Law; B.A. DePauw University, 1964; Ph.D., Michigan State Univer-
sity, 1973; J.D., University of Michigan, 1973.
'17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
3 There are many works on Dartmouth College and the Dartmouth College case.
See generally, M. BAXTER, DANIEL WEBSTER AND THE SUPREME COURT 65-109 (1966); F.
CHASE. A HISTORY OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE AND THE TOWN OF HANOVER, NEW HAMP-
SHIRE (1891); H. FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PENUMBRA 9-12 (1969); J. HERBST, FROM CRISIS TO CIusis 128-31, 146-47, 171-73, 232-43
(1982); J. LORD. A HISTORY OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE: 1815-1909 (1932); J. MCCOLLUM.
ELEAZOR WHEELOCK, FOUNDER OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE (1939); REPORT OF THE CASE OF
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE AGAINST WOODWARD (T. Farrar ed. Portsmouth 1819); L.
RICHARDSON, HISTORY OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE (1932); J. SHIRLEY. THE DARTMOUTH
COLLEGE CAUSES AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1879); F. STITES, PRI-
VATE INTEREST AND PUBLIC GAIN (1972); L. TURNER, WILLIAM PLUMER OF NEW HAMP-
SHIRE, 1759-1850, at 295-302 (1962); J. WHITEHEAD, THE SEPARATION OF COLLEGE AND
STATE 53-88 (1973). See also, Allison, The Rise and Probable Decline of Private Corpora-
tions In America in REPORT OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR AS.
SOCIATION, HELD AT SARATOGA SPRINGS, NEW YORK, AUGUST 20, 21 and 22, 1884, at 241
(1884); Baxter, Should the Dartmouth College Case Have Been Reargued?, 33 NEW ENG.
Q. 19 (1960); Daniell, Eleazor Wheelock and the Dartmouth College Charter, HIST. N.
H. 3 (1969); The Dartmouth College Case, 8 AM. L. REV. 189 (1874); Denham, An Histor-
Ical Development of the Contract Theory in the Dartmouth College Case, 7 MICH. L.
REV. 201 (1909); Doe, A New View of the Dartmouth College Case, 6 HARv. L. REV. 161
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was established as a "religious and literary institution"4 through
the efforts of the Reverend Eleazor Wheelock, who successfully
solicited donations from individuals.5 New Hampshire's royal
Governor John Wentworth granted Wheelock a charter for Dart-
mouth College in 1769.6 A self-perpetuating board of twelve trus-
tees was incorporated "forever." 7 A nasty fight between Dart-
mouth President John Wheelock and the Board of Trustees led to
the removal of Wheelock from the presidency, and the quarrel
spilled into politics in 1815. The New Hampshire legislature then
amended the charter of Dartmouth, changing the College to a
University, adding nine new members of the Board of Trustees,
and creating a new Board of twenty-five Overseers.8 The Board
of Trustees of Dartmouth College formally refused to accept the
charter amendment 9 and filed a suit in state court challenging
the validity of the legislature's action. When the New Hampshire
high court upheld the amendment, 0 the College trustees took an
appeal to the United States Supreme Court, where they pre-
vailed."
For the purpose of applying the federal contracts clause in
the Dartmouth College case, the Supreme Court distinguished
between public corporations, which for the most part remained
(1892); Hagan, The Dartmouth College Case, 19 CEO. L.J. 411 (1931); Hall, The Dart-
mouth College Case, 20 GREEN BAG 224 (1908); Jenkins, Should the Dartmouth College
Decision Be Recalled? 51 AM. L. REV. 711 (1917); North, The Political Background of the
Dartmouth College Case, 18 NEW ENG. Q. 181 (1945); Noyes, Webster's Debt to Mason in
the Dartmouth College Case, 28 AM. L. REV. 356 (1894); Orton, Conjusion of Property
with Privilege: Dartmouth College Case, 67 INDEPENDENT 392, 448 (1909); Robbins, The
Private Corporation: Its Constitutional Genesis, 28 GEO. L.J. 165 (1939); Russell, Status
and Tendencies of the Dartmouth College Case, 30 AM. L. REv. 321 (1896); Trickett, The
Dartmouth College Paralogism, 40 AM. L. REV. 175 (1906); Warren, An Historical Note
on the Dartmouth College Case, 46 AM. L. REV. 665 (1912); Willis, The Dartmouth Col-
lege Case, Then and Now, 19 ST. Louis L. REv. 183 (1934).
417 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 627.
5 Id. at 632-33.
6 Id. at 519-37.
7 Id. at 525, 527.
8 Id. at 539-44; Act of June 27, 1816, cl. 32, reprinted in 8 LAvS OF N.H. 505
(1920).
9 J. LORD, supra note 3, at 687-94.
10 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 1 N.H. 111 (1816). Arguments of
counsel before the New Hampshire court are reprinted in 65 N.H. 473-624.
11 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 518.
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subject to state legislative control, and private corporations, the
charters of which were contracts with the state, protected by the
contracts clause from arbitrary legislative amendment or re--
peal.12
The distinction was imprecise, but in general a public corpo-
ration was one created for the purposes of government, an instru-
ment of government founded on governmental property. 13 A pri-
vate corporation, in contrast, was founded on private property
and was not created for purposes of government. 14
In his opinion for the Court, Marshall declared that Dart-
mouth itself was an "eleemosynary" and a "private corpora-
tion"'15 because it was "endowed by private individuals,
who.., bestowed their funds for the propagation of the chris-
tian religion among the Indians, and for the promotion of piety
and learning generally." 16 Dartmouth was "incorporated for the
preservation of its property, and the perpetual application of
that property to the objects of its creation." 17 In these circum-
stances, Marshall declared, Dartmouth's charter was "plainly a
contract to which the donors, the trustees and the crown (to
whose rights and obligations New Hampshire succeeds) were the
original parties."' 18 Because the Crown originally stipulated in the
charter-contract that the property of the donors would be held
and applied by twelve trustees, the New Hampshire charter
amendment increasing the number of trustees to twenty-one and
adding a board of overseers "totally changed" the system, uncon-
stitutionally impairing the obligation of the contract.' 9
In a rococo concurring opinion, elaborately decorated with
citations, Justice Joseph Story identified three types of corpora-
12 The United States Supreme Court first distinguished between "public" and "pri-
vate" corporations in dictum in Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 51-52 (1815).
For recent discussions of the public-private distinction, see Frug, The City as a Legal Con-
cept, 93 HAIv. L. 1Ev. 1057, 1059-1105 (1980); Newmyer, JusticeJoseph Story's Doctrine
of "Public and Private Corporations"and the Rise of the Business Corporation, 25 DEPAUL
L. REy. 825 (1976).
13 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 638.
1 Id. at 632 -39.
15 Id. at 634.
16 Id. at 633.17 Id. at 641.
18 Id. at 643-44.
19 Id. at 651-54.
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tions. Strictly public corporations, founded solely on public
property for governmental purposes, remained fully subject to
state legislative control. 20 The charters of strictly private corpora-
tions, such as Dartmouth, founded principally or exclusively on
private property for non-governmental purposes, were protected
by the federal contracts clause from arbitrary legislative amend-
ment or repeal, although a legislature could expressly reserve a
power to amend or repeal the charter.2'1 A mixed public and pri-
vate corporation was "in many respects .. .subject to legislative
control," although the legislature could not "take away the prop-
erty of the corporation, or change the uses of its private funds ac-
quired under the public faith."2
This Article surveys the legal and experiential basis of the
Dartmouth College doctrine, focusing on the case as involving
educational and, indirectly, religious corporations. The Article
concludes that Dartmouth College was primarily a civil liberties
decision in which the Supreme Court imaginatively adapted
English common law tradition and the contract clause of the
Constitution to advance two complementary goals: first, to pro-
tect at least some existing educational and religious institutions
from the attacks of legislatures responding to religious and parti-
san groups, thus advancing the constitutional separation of
church and state; and second, to encourage the foundation of
new educational and charitable institutions. Part I surveys the
English law of corporations, with special attention to the law of
charitable corporations, so far as it is relevant to the Dartmouth
College case. Part II discusses the American experience with the
founding and control of colleges as a basis for the Dartmouth
College decision. Part III discusses the American experience with
municipal corporations, business corporations, and corporate
reservation clauses as further bases for the decision, and the
source of important distinctions drawn by the Court. Part IV
summarily analyzes Dartmouth College as a civil liberties case,
one in which the Court deliberately went beyond the specific in-
20 Id. at 667, 669 (Story, J., concurring).
21 Id. at 675, 681,684-90, 712 (Story, J., concurring).
22 Id. at 694 (Story, J., concurring). Justice Washington also filed a concurring opin-
ion, dividing corporations into two, rather than three, types. Id. at 659-62 (Washington,
J., concurring).
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tentions of the framers to advance associational freedom and the
goals of the first amendment's religion clauses against the states.
I. THE INHERITANCE:
THE ENGLISH LAW OF CORPORATIONS
What influence did the English law of corporations and
charities have upon the formulation of the Dartmouth College
doctrine? When it decided Dartmouth College in 1819, the Su-
preme Court was well-informed about these aspects of English
law. - This section answers the question by surveying the English
law of corporations, and especially charitable corporations, so
far as it had developed and was relevant to Dartmouth College in
1819, and by discussing the applicability of the English law to
the case.2
A. The Functions of English Corporations
English common and statutory law provided conceptual
points of departure for the Supreme Court's analysis. Corpora-
tions performed several basic functions in the English legal sys-
tem of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Corporations
were used for government in its broadest sense-for organizing
and managing municipalities and the like, as well as charitable,
religious, commercial and other types of institutions. 2
Equally important, the corporation as an "artificial person"2
23 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), concerned the power of
Congress to charter a corporate bank and occasioned an extensive investigation of the na-
ture and uses of corporations in England and the United States. Trustees of Philadelphia
Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1819), concerned the power of an
equity court to enforce a bequest to an unincorporated charitable association. J. Story,
Note L On Charitable Bequests, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 3 app. (1819) was addressed princi-
pally to the issue raised in Trustees of Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n. Dartmouth College con-
cerned both corporations and charities.
24 The survey of English law of corporations is complete and correct as far as it goes
but is not intended to be a full account. The subjects chosen for analysis and the focus of
analysis, were determined by Dartmouth College, and by what the Justices apparently
knew about the relevant English law.
25 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 455-56, 458-59 (Ox-




enabled individuals in a group to take property and legal priv-
ileges in "perpetual succession," which Blackstone characterized
as "the very end of... incorporation." Perpetual succession
was simply the power of appointing new members in place of
those who had been removed from membership. Perpetuity as
such was not unique to corporations, but could have been, and
was, regularly achieved through the use of the trust. The Inns of
Court and other venerable English institutions,28 a wide variety
of charitable institutions,29 and endowed dissenting academies"
achieved relative permanence through the use of the unincorpo-
rated trust. However, the trust device was both inconvenient,
because it required endless conveyances, 31 and risky, since
trustees might die, resign, or become incapacitated, necessitating
governmental aid to revive the organization.3 2 As Marshall indi-
cated in Dartmouth College, corporations were used chiefly for
the purpose of avoiding "the perplexing intricacies, the hazard-
ous and endless necessity, of perpetual conveyances."3
B. Parliament and Corporations
The Supreme Court was particularly interested in the rela-
tionship between the English government and corporations. Par-
liament, of course, was omnipotent.34 It could charter a corpora-
tion or authorize the crown to do so.ss Perhaps more importantly,
27 Id. at 463.
2 1 S. KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CORPORTIONS 7 (London 1794 & photo. re-
print 1978); F. MAITLAND, Trust and Corporation, in SELECTED ESSAYS 141, 189-196
(1936).
29 W. JORDAN, PHILANTHROPY IN ENGLAND, 1480-1660, at 122 (1959).
30 H. MCLACHLAN, ENGLISH EDUCATION UNDER THE TEST ACTS 4 (1931); Herbst,
The First Three American Colleges: Schools of the Reformation, in 8 PERSPECTIVES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 38-40 (D. Fleming and B. Bailyn eds. 1974). Although legal perpetuity
was probably not a major consideration of business organizations, business, especially
after the Bubble Act, 6 Geo., ch. 18 (1720), which restricted the development of the bus-
iness corporation, often organized under private trusts or partnerships. C. COOKE, CoRPO-
RATION, TRUST AND COMPANY 80-88, 95 (1951); A. DuBois, THE ENGLISH BUSINESS COMi-
PANY AFTER THE BUBBLE ACT, 1720-1800, at 217-19 (1938); Gower, The English Private
Company, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 535,535-36 (1953).
31 1 S. KYD, supra note 28, at 7.
32 Herbst, supra note 30, at 38.
33 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636.
34 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at 462.
35 Id. at 461.
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it could modify or destroy a corporation as easily as create it. 36
Even Edmund Burke, who conceded that a charter was a "con-
tract" between Parliament and the incorporated East India
Company, insisted that Parliament alone was the judge of whe-
ther the company so abused its privileges that the contract was
broken. 37 In practice, however, Parliament in the eighteenth cen-
tury usually heeded pleas to respect corporate "vested rights,"
and seldom took away economically valuable privileges without
providing compensation, presenting a model of deliberate legis-
lative inaction for Americans to follow.
C. The Crown and Corporations
The Supreme Court was much more interested in the English
royal prerogative with respect to corporations. Institutionally,
limited government in England meant a Crown restricted by
law, and the legal relationship between Crown and corporation
provided a model of limited government for Americans to study
and, partially, to emulate.
Both the legal limitations upon the prerogative power to
create corporations and to recharter existing corporations sup-
ported Justice Buller's conclusion in a case involving the rechar-
tering of a borough that "the grant of incorporation [is] a com-
pact between the Crown and a certain number of subjects, the
latter of whom undertake in consideration of the privileges
which are bestowed, to exert themselves for the good government
of the place." 39
The King's express or implied consent was necessary for the
creation of a corporation, 40 and in the eighteenth century most
corporations were created, or recreated, by royal charter. 41 The
Crown thus had ultimate control over the terms of a charter, ex-
cept so far as limited by Act of Parliament or the law. However,
even within the area of royal discretion, the King's power was
3Id. at 473.
32 P3PARL. HisT. ENG. 1317, 1318(1783).
8 A. DuBoIs, supra note 30, at 120, 196 n. 251, 197 n. 252.
39 King v. Pasmore, 100 Eng. Rep. 531,556 (K.B. 1789).
40 1 W.BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at 461; 1 S. KYD, supra note 28, at 41.
41 W.BLAcKSWONE,supra note 25, at 461.
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not absolute. The Crown, by virtue of the prerogative alone,
could not impose a corporation on unwilling individuals, 42 and a
majority of those intending to be incorporated had to accept a
charter before the corporation could go into operation. 43 Thus,
persons seeking a charter had some leverage, and the charter
which ultimately issued could and often did contain provisions
which were compromises between what was fully desired by
both Crown and corporators. 44
Equally important to Americans, after a corporation was
created, the Crown could neither dissolve the corporation, nor
take away its privileges or immunities by virtue of the prerog-
ative alone. 45 A corporation could, of course, voluntarily accept a
charter modification. 46
Although the Crown could correct corporate abuses of char-
tered privileges through writs of mandamus, 47 prohibition, 4 and
scire facias49 and informations in the nature of quo warranto in
the King's Bench, 0 these procedures were unwieldy and aroused
great opposition when used by Charles II and James II for polit-
ical purposes. 51 In order to retain control over corporations it
42 Rexv. Askew, 98 Eng. Rep. 139, 147-48 (K.B. 1768).
43 1 s. KYD, supra note 28, at 65; J. CHITTY, A TREATISE ON THE LAv OF THE PRE-
ROGATIVES OF THE CROWN; AND THE RELATIVE DUTIES OF THE SUBJECT 124 (London 1820).
14 j. LEVIN, THE CHARTER CONTROVERSY IN THE CITY OF LONDON, 1660-1688, AND
ITS CONSEQUENCES 3-4, 88-89 (1969).
45 Rex v. Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge, 97 Eng. Rep. 1027, 1031 S. C., sub nom.
King v. University of Cambridge, 96 Eng. Rep. 316 (K.B. 1765); King v. Pasmore, 100
Eng. Rep. 531, 534 (K.B. 1789); J. CHITTY, supra note 43, at 132; 1 S. KYD, supra note
28, at 65-66; 2 id. at 447.
46 97 Eng. Rep. 1027, 1031 (K.B. 1765).
47 2 S. KYD, supra note 28, at 291-394. On the superintendence of English corpora-
tions, see Pound, Visitatorial Jurisdiction Over Corporations in Equity, 49 HARV. L. REV.
369(1936).
48 Bentley v. Bishop of Ely, 94 Eng. Rep. 132 (K.B. 1729).
49 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at 260-61; J. CHTTY, supra note 43, at 330-31.
so 2 S. KYD, supra note 28, at 395-445.
51 Both Charles II and James II filed information in the nature of quo warranto
against borough and other corporations seeking forfeiture of their charters on the grounds
that they had acted contrary to their charter provisions. Nearly all boroughs capitulated,
surrendering their old charters and accepting new ones. In the new charters, the Crown
retained the effective power to determine who would serve as corporate officers. The
Crown thus secured a royal patronage and substantial influence over local affairs and the
selection of representatives to Parliament. See Sacret, The Restoration Government and
Municipal Corporations, 45 ENC. HIST. REV. 232 (1930); J. LEVIN, supra note 44, at 1-16,
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created, the Crown often included reservation clauses in original
charters or in charters recreating corporations which had their
original charters as a result of proceedings on an information in
the nature of quo warranto. When the original or revised charter
was accepted, the corporators would assent to the reserved
power of the Crown, in effect waiving the protective legal re-
strictions on the royal prerogative. 52 For example, after the City
of Chester defaulted in a proceeding against it on an information
in the nature of quo warranto, forfeiting its right to be a corpora-
tion, King Charles II granted a new charter, reserving to the
Crown the discretionary power to remove corporate officers.
The Bubble Act, which authorized the Crown to charter two
marine insurance corporations, provided that the Crown would
reserve a power to terminate the charters if the Crown found the
"continuance of the.., two corporations to be hurtful or incon-
venient to the public" at any time after thirty-one years from the
issuance of the charter.-4 In East India Company v. Sandys,5s
82-95, 109-12 app. Only the City of London contested the Crown's information, resulting
in a celebrated case. Id. at 17-81. King v. City of London, (K.B. 1683), in 4 A COMPLETE
COLLECTION OF STATE-TRALS, AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER
CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS; FROM THE REIGN OF KING RICHARD II TO THE END OF THE
REIGN OF KING GEORGE 1, at 769 (2d ed. London 1730) (1st ed. London 1719).5 2 Although the practice was otherwise, at least in the time of the Tudors, it was
thought that where the Crown was the founder of a charity and promulgated statutes for
the governance of the institution, the Crown could not promulgate new statutes without
proper consent unless the Crown had expressly reserved power to do so in the original
charter or statutes. L. SHELFORD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF MORTMAIN, AND
CHARITABLE USES AND TRUSTS, 346-47 (London 1836); cf. Bentley v, Bishop of Ely, 93
Eng. Rep. 936,94 Eng. Rep. 305 (K.B. 1730) (rev'd H.L.).
0 Rex v. Amery, 100 Eng. Rep. 278 (K.B. 1788), rev'd, 1 Eng. Rep. 981 (H.L.
1790); 2 S. KYD, supra note 28, at 94,492-511.
54 6 Geo., ch. 18 (1720). For other examples of reservation clauses included in bus-
iness or guild corporation charters, see, SELECT STATUTES AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL
DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE REIGNS OF ELIZABETH AND JAMES 1 at 455, 464 (4th ed.
1913); SELECT CHARTERS OF TRADING COMPANIES, A.D. 1530-1607, at 42, 77-78, 97, 122,
136, 185, 230, 240, 262 (1913); A. DuBois, supra note 30, at 51 n.50, 143 n.30, 205 n.290.
n.290.
5 (K.B. 1684), in 7 A COLLECTION OF STATE-TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS UPON
HIGH-TREASON AND OTHER MISDEMEANORS, FROM THE REIGN OF KING EDWARD VI TO
THE PRESENT TIME 493 (2d. ed. London 1735) (1st ed. London 1719) [hereinafter cited as
STATE TRIALS]. So far as observed, the first American reference to Jeffrey's mention of the
royal reservation clause was by Warren Dutton in his argument in Charles River Bridge v.
Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 443-44 (1837).
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Chief Justice Jeffreys upheld the royal grant of a trading monop-
oly to the East India Company, noting that the King's charter
had reserved full power to terminate the grant on three years' no-
tice whenever the King decided the grant was no longer "profit-
able ... to this Realm.."56
Except for charitable corporations, discussed below, English
law recognized no permanent distinction between "public" and
"private" corporations for the purposes of determining the limits
of the royal prerogative.57 The limitations on the Crown were the
same for borough and other local governmental corporations as
they were for other non-charitable corporations. The inclusion of
municipal with other types of corporations made some sense,
since the English borough was typically a closed corporation con-
cerned principally with trade and, secondarily in some cases,
with property holding. 58
D. Eleemosynary Corporations
In the view of the United States Supreme Court, Dartmouth
College was not a "public" but a "private" corporation and,
more, a private "eleemosynary" corporation. That Dartmouth
was eleemosynary, or charitable, was important because only
eleemosynary corporations were technically "private" in English
56 7 STATE TRIALS, supra note 55, at 556.
57 After the Revolution of 1688, the royal courts distinguished between public and
private offices in mandamus actions, holding, for example, that a mandamus would not
lie to restore a party to a place "in which the publick is in no way concerned." Vaughan v.
Company of Gun-Makers in London, 87 Eng. Rep. 839, 839 (K.B. 1704). By the late eigh-
teenth century, the King's Bench had eliminated the public-private distinction in manda-
mus actions. See Rex v. Barker, 97 Eng. Rep. 823 (K.B. 1762); 2 S. KYD, supra note 28, at
318, 320. For the purposes of determining the scope of corporate jurisdiction, the English
courts recognized a distinction between territorially-based governmental corporations "of
publick concern" and "private societies" which existed only for the better government of
its own members. See City of London v. Wood, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1598 (K.B. 1702); 2 S.
KYD, supra note 28, at 395. There was also a loose distinction between public companies
which had a large number of members, transferable shares, and a separate management,
and private companies which were smaller operations, but the distinction did not depend
on incorporation as such. Cower, supra note 30, at 535, 536; W. WATSON, A TREATISE OF
THE LAw OF PARTNERSHIP 3-5 (rev. 2d ed. London 1807).
58 F. MAITLAND, TOWNSHIP AND BOROUGH 95 (1898); J. TEAFORD, THE MUNICIPAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 4-6, 14 (1975); Frug, supra note 12, at 1090-95.
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law, at least for the purposes of determining or characterizing
the relationship between the English government and corpora-
tions. Between the late sixteenth and the early nineteenth cen-
turies, the English developed a special system of charitable cor-
porations which was a sub-set of the general law governing the
prerogative and the royal courts. This law of charitable corpora-
tions influenced the Court's analysis in the Dartmouth College
case.
The "private eleemosynary corporation" was one category
within the English classification system. The system was based
on the need to determine what persons or courts had jurisdiction
to "visit" the corporation, that is, essentially, to superintend the
corporation and to resolve intracorporate disputes.-, The major
division was into "ecclesiastical" and "lay." 6 In general, ecclesi-
astical corporations, those composed entirely of "spiritual per-
sons," 61 were visited only by church officials including, after the
Reformation, the King as head of the church. 62 Lay corporations
were all corporations except ecclesiastical, and were in turn sub-
divided into "civil" and "eleemosynary." The "civil" category
comprehended most of the important non-religious corporations
in England, including both municipal and business corporations,
as well as the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge (but not the
colleges within them) and such bodies as the company of sur-
geons in London. The King was said to be the visitor of civil
corporations, 84 but in practice exclusive jurisdiction over lay cor-
porations was in the royal courts, where disputes were resolved
according to the course and rules of the common law." Eleemos-
ynary corporations, including charitable hospitals and colleges
within the universities, were a special type of lay corporation.
Before the Reformation, charitable corporations were considered
ecclesiastical, and subject to visitation by the church,6 but as the
'9 See generally Bridge, Keeping the Peace in the Universities: The Role of the Vis-
itor, 86 L.Q. REv. 531 (1970).
60 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at 458.
61 Id.
12 Id. at 468.
6 Id. at 469.
64 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 469-70.
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authority of the church contracted, public policy and the com-
mon law developed a special set of rules for charity. Although
charitable corporations (with the exception of those directly con-
nected with the church) became lay, as opposed to ecclesiastical,
visitatorial jurisdiction did not automatically go to the King or
the royal courts. In the first instance, visitatorial jurisdiction
went to the founder, the person who first endowed the charity,
or the founder's appointee, who exercised the visitatorial juris-
diction according to the corporate charter and statutes generally
to the exclusion of the royal courts, so long as revenues were not
misappropriated. 7 A privately-founded charitable corporation
with a visitor whose decision on matters within his jurisdiction
was final and not subject to appeal to the royal courts was said to
be a "private corporation."
The English "private eleemosynary corporation" originated
in the Tudor responses to the difficult problems of financing ed-
ucation and alleviating poverty in the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries68 after the governmental seizure of reli-
gious corporations which had performed these functions.0 One
element of the Tudor program was to encourage the wealthy
classes to create the institutions voluntarily and contribute their
resources to solve these pressing social difficulties. 70 The theory
was that individuals would be encouraged to commit their
wealth to socially useful purposes if they themselves could shape
the organization and lay down the terms for the distribution of
the bounty. The Elizabethan Statute of Workhouses, 71 for exam-
ple, provided that a donor could found and incorporate hospitals
and work houses by the simple expedient of a deed enrolled in
chancery. In all such institutions, the corporation was to be com-
posed of a head and a number of members. Beyond this, the will
of the founder controlled. In addition to establishing the rules for
67 Id. at 471. See Ex parte Berkhampstead Free School, 35 Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch.
1813); Attorney General v. Corporation of Bedford, 28 Eng. Rep. 323 (Ch. 1754); G.
COOPER, A TREATISE OF PLEADING ON THE EQUITY-SIDE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY
280 (London 1809).
68 G. JONES, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF CHARITY 1532-1827, at 22 (1969).
69 1 S. KYD, supra note 28, at 56-57.
70 W. JORDAN, supra note 29, at 108, 115-16, 149-51.
71 39 Eliz., ch. 5 (1597), made permanent by 21 Jac., ch. 1 (1623).
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the operation of the corporation, the founder could name his
heirs or others to visit the institution.
If the wealthy were to be effectively encouraged to grant
large sums to charity, it was necessary to prevent the abuse of
charitable trusts. Although Chancery had the power to redress
the misappropriation of charitable funds, in practice the process
was inadequate.72 The Elizabethan Statute of Charitable Uses73
provided a more efficient mechanism, authorizing the formation
of commissions under the authority of the Chancellor to inquire
into the administration of charities and to correct abuses where
necessary.74 A special provision exempted from commission inves-
tigation certain charities, including colleges, which had special
governors or visitors appointed by their founders.75
The Tudor system of private government of charities was re-
fined and strengthened as a result of the constitutional crisis of
the 1680's, but the policy basis decisively shifted from the promo-
tion of charitable giving to the protection of existing institutions
from governmental control. The shift was in part precipitated by
James II's attempt to dictate who would be President of St. Mary
Magdalen College, at Oxford. After the College failed to obey a
royal command to elect a Catholic as President,7" an Ecclesiasti-
cal Commission removed the duly elected President, Dr. John
Hough, and nearly all of the fellows.7 Dr. Hough had unsuccess-
fully challenged the jurisdiction of the Commission on the
grounds that Magdalen was a "private College" with the Bishop
of Winchester as the duly-constituted visitor to superintend the
institution. 78
Magdalen College and other excesses of James II and his
courts and commissions still conditioned the legal atmosphere
when the important case of Philips v. Bury79 arose in the early
72 G. JONES, supra note 68, at 17-22.
73 43 Eliz., ch. 4 (1601).
71 Id. § 1.
75 Id. § 3.
71 MAGDALEN COLLEGE AND KING JAMES 111686-1688, at xii (J. Bloxam ed. 1886)
[hereinafter cited as MAGDALEN COLLEGE]; 8 D. HuME, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM
THE INVASION OFJULIUS CAESAR TO THE REVOLUTION IN 1688, at 279 (London 1770).
77 MAGDALEN COLLEGE, supra note 76, at xvi-xvii.
78 In re St. Mary Magdalen College (1687), 4 STATE TRIALS, supra note 55, at 262,
275.
79 90 Eng. Rep. 198, (K.B. 1692) rev'd, 100 Eng. Rep. 186 (H.L. 1696). "
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1690s. Exeter College in the University of Oxford was founded
by William Stapleton, and incorporated by Queen Elizabeth.
The statutes appointed the Bishop of Exeter to be visitor. In
1689, the rector and scholars of the college expelled one Colmer.
He appealed, and a visitatorial delegate reversed his expulsion.
Thereafter, in the summer of 1690, the Bishop of Exeter at-
tempted a general visitation of the college. The rector and many
scholars objected that this visitation was not valid under the sta-
tutes and refused to appear before the Bishop when ordered. The
Bishop thereupon removed the rector, Dr. Bury, and the non-ap-
pearing scholars. The case was brought to test the validity of this
removal. In the King's Bench, three justices found for Dr. Bury, 0
with Chief Justice John Holt dissenting."' On appeal to the House
of Lords, the judgment was reversed without opinion.82 Holt was
later assumed to have stated the law of the case.
Holt's opinion was a merging of prior legal developments in
the area of charitable corporations with the constitutional prin-
ciples which had emerged from the Glorious Revolution. The
crucial passages follow:
[Tihat we may the better apprehend the nature of a visitor, we
are to consider that there are in law two sorts of corporations
aggregate; such as are for public government, and such as are
for private charity. Those that are for the public government
of a town, city, mystery, or the like, being for public advan-
tage, are to be governed according to the laws of the land; if
they make any particular private laws and constitutions, the
validity and justice of them is examinable in the King's Courts;
of these there are no particular private founders, and conse-
quently no particular visitor.... But private and particular
corporations for charity, founded and endowed by private per-
sons, are subject to the private government of those who erect
them .... IT]his visitatorial power ... is an appointment of
law; it ariseth from the property which the founder had in the
lands assigned to support the charity; and as he is the author of
the charity, the law gives him and his heirs a visitatorial
power, that is, an authority to inspect the actions and regulate
80 90 Eng. Rep. at 200-12.
81 100 Eng. Rep. at 186.
82 90 Eng. Rep. at 229.
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the behaviour of the members that partake of the char-
ity. .. . What is the visitor to do? He is to judge according to
the statutes and rules of the college.. .. [If he hath a juris-
diction and cognizance of the matter and person, and he giveth
sentence in the matter . . . there is no appeal, if the founder
hath not thought fit to direct one. That an appeal lieth to the
Common Law Courts of England is without prece-
dent .... [T]he cause of the visitor's sentence is not exam-
inable."3
Holt carefully adapted the old law to the new constitutional
regime of royal and judicial restraint and private control of insti-
tutions by the English establishment. To a significant extent, pre-
rogative and judicial power stopped, or at least lost much force,
where private property began. It was not the mere existence of a
visitor which deprived the courts of jurisdiction over privately-
founded charitable corporations, but rather that the visitatorial
power was an incident of the private property upon which the
corporation was erected by a private founder. And even if pro-
motion of charitable giving remained implicitly a reason to favor
wholly private control of charitable corporations, it was no
longer the stated goal.
The private corporation-private visitor system was designed
specifically for what might be called a "separated powers" corpo-
ration. The charter incorporated both the head of the institution
and those who were to receive the benefit of the charity and gave
the whole group ownership and control of the foundation prop-
erty. Thus, a typical charter would incorporate the rector and
scholars of a school, the master and fellows of a college, or the
warden and poor of a hospital.8& The visitor would be an alto-
gether separate officer and would not own the property, receive
any of the foundation revenues or have day-to-day responsibil-
ities for administering the enterprise. If the visitor were active
and responsible, he would settle intracorporate disputes and
oversee the operations to prevent or redress mismanagement.
83 100 Eng. Rep. at 189-90.
84 The corporations established under the Statute of Workhouses, 39 Eliz., ch. 5,
were of the "separated power" type.
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Serious problems developed because of the propensity of
charitable trustees to abuse their trusts. Whether or not there
was a private visitor, equity could entertain an information or an
action for an accounting against charitable trustees accused of
misappropriating revenues for their personal benefit,"' but it
could not act to redress abuses, other than those involving rev-
enue, which were within a private visitor's jurisdiction.8 Where
there were no private visitors capable of acting, because, for
example, the founder had appointed no visitors and no heirs
could be found, an action against unscrupulous trustees had to be
split. That part concerning the direct misappropriation of rev-
enues had to be brought in Chancery. That part of the action
which directly concerned other abuses normally within the juris-
diction of the private visitor had to be brought before the Chan-
cellor by petition; the Chancellor, as keeper of the Great Seal, ex-
ercised the royal prerogative to enforce the charter and the
founder's statutes.A1 The Chancellor here had a visitatorial juris-
diction necessitated by the non-existence of a private visitor.
The government acquired visitatorial jurisdiction by neces-
sity in some other situations as well. In some separated-power
corporations, the visitor was also a governor, creating a conflict
of interest, so the court or the Chancellor had to exercise some
control.88
The "unitary" charitable corporation, which was essentially
85 Attorney General v. Governors of the Foundling Hospital, 30 Eng. Rep. 514 (Ch.
1793); Attorney-General v. Corporations of Bedford, 28 Eng. Rep. 323 (Ch. 1754).
13 King v. Bishop of Ely, 101 Eng. Rep. 267 (K.B. 1794); King v. Bishop of Ely, 100
Eng. Rep. 157 (K.B. 1788); Attorney-General v. Talbot, 27 Eng. Rep. 903 (Ch. 1747); At-
torney-General v. Lock, 26 Eng. Rep. 897 (Ch. 1744); Attorney-General v. Price, 26 Eng.
Rep. 866 (Ch. 1744); Philips v. Bury, 100 Eng. Rep. 186 (K.B. 1692), rev'd, (H.L. 1696).
87 Attorney-General v. Earl of Clarendon, 34 Eng. Rep. 190 (Ch.; Lord Chancellor
1810); Ex parte Dann, 32 Eng. Rep. 715 (Lord Chancellor 1804); Attorney-General v.
Dixie, 33 Eng. Rep. 388 (Ch.; Lord Chancellor 1802); Ex parte Wrangham, 30 Eng. Rep.
803 (Lord Chancellor 1795); King v. Master and Fellows of Saint Catherine's Hall, Cam-
bridge, 100 Eng. Rep. 991 (K.B. 1791); cf. Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. 1284 (K.B. 1699)
(dictum by Holt, C.J.); G. COOPER, supra note 67, at xxcii.
88 See, e.g., Dominus Rex v. Episcopum Chester, 93 Eng. Rep. 855 (K.B. 1727
(mandamus issued to corporate officer where the officer was also the visitor, on the
grounds that the court had to exercise the visitatorial power where dual office-holding pre-
vented the officer from visiting himself); cf. Attorney General v. Dixie, 33 Eng. Rep. 388
(ph.; Lord Chancellor 1802).
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a simple incorporated charitable trust, was equally important. A
single set of governors or trustees was incorporated and given full
ownership and control of the foundation property. No separate
visitor was appointed, and the objects of the charity, that is, the
fellows, the scholars or the poor, were not made part of the cor-
poration. The unitary charitable corporation had the obvious ad-
vantage of institutional simplicity. It became popular in England
during the eighteenth century and was an organizational scheme
often used for incorporated colleges in America. 9 Dartmouth
College was a unitary corporation.
The problem of jurisdiction over the unitary corporation was
extremely complicated. The Statute of Charitable Uses specif-
ically exempted any college, hospital, or free school which had
special visitors, governors, or overseers, from investigation by the
charity commissioners. 90 In the seventeenth century, the Chan-
cellor ruled that this proviso did not exempt unitary corporations
from inquiries into the use of revenues. 91 Early in the eighteenth
century, the court of equity held that where no separate visitors
were appointed, the word "governor" in a charter did not imply
"visitor," and that where governors received rents and profits,
they were accountable to a charitable commission for the use of
the revenues.9 2 In 1744, Chancellor Hardwicke stated that gover-
nors who received revenues should be accountable for their use,
but that the trustees had an "absolute" authority over the non-
revenue aspects of the charity.9
89 See, e.g., Charter of Yale College, reprinted in T. CLAP, THE ANNALS OR HISTORY
OF YALE-COLLECE, IN NEW HAVEN, IN THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT, FROM THE FIRST
FOUNDING THEREOF, IN THE YEAR 1700 TO THE YEAR 1766, at 45 (New-Haven 1766); Char-
ter of King's College, which was later renamed Columbia, THE CHARTER OF THE COL-
LECE OF NEW YORK, IN AMERICA (New York 1754).
9D 43 Eliz., ch. 4.
91 In re Sutton Colefield (Ch. 1636) in C. DUKE, THE LAW OF CHARITARLE USES, RE-
VISED AND MUCH ENLARGED: WITH MANY CASES IN LAW BOTH AGAINST AND MODERN 68
(London 1676); Hynshaw and Pydwers and the Mayor of Morpeth (Ch. 1630), in id. at
69.
92 Case of Birmingham School, 25 Eng. Rep. 125 (Ch. 1725). However, if the poor
were incorporated and received revenues, "governors" were considered visitors. 25 Eng.
Rep. at 126. Such a corporation would be a separated power corporation.93 Attorney-General v. Lock, 26 Eng. Rep: 897, 898 (Ch. 1744). See also Attorney
General v. Middleton, 28 Eng. Rep. 210, 212 (Ch. 1751), where Chancellor Hardwicke
seemed to state that the trustees of a unitary corporation had full visitatorial authority
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Giving trustees of unitary charitable corporations absolute
control over non-monetary matters was indefensible because it
invited abuses in the election of trustees, the filling of places, and
the like. Not surprisingly, the system did not survive long. The
unitary corporation without separate visitors was indistinguish-
able in principle from the separated power corporation in which
there was no visitors capable of acting. By the early nineteenth
century, the system of discipline constructed for separated power
corporations without visitors had been extended to unitary cor-
porations. The Chancellor, exercising the royal prerogative for
the Crown, had authority to correct non-monetary abuses, while
the court of equity superintended application of the revenues.94
As a practical matter, the English system of superintending
charities did not work well at all. Enforcement was intolerably
complicated and expensive, and the absence of effective super-
vision invited widespread abuses of charitable trusts. In 1795,
Chief Justice Kenyon complained of grammar schools which
were merely "empty walls without scholars, and every thing ne-
glected but the receipt of the salaries and emoluments." 95 After
the turn of the century, as the Dartmouth College case developed
in America, the Whig reformer, Henry Brougham, proposed
comprehensive Parliamentary investigations of charitable
abuse. 9 He strongly criticized charities with "special visitors,"
and argued, incorrectly, that the law regarded the "inheritance
of the poor as matter of public not of private jurisdiction .... 9
The Tory Quarterly Review responded that the appointment of
visitors was a prerogative of the founder, 99 and that investiga-
tions would interfere with the will of the donorlce and would be
where no visitors were expressly appointed by the founder. However, the report of this
case is thoroughly garbled. See 2 S. KYD, supra note 28, at 194-95. Hardwicke was re-
ported to have made the same statement in a broad and unqualified dictum in Green v.
Rutherforth, 27 Eng. Rep. 1144, 1149 (Ch. 1750).
94 See, e.g., Attorney-General v. Dixie, 33 Eng. Rep. 388 (Ch; Lord Chancellor
1802).
95 King v. Archbishop of York, 101 Eng. Rep. 664, 666 (K.B. 1795).
96 See generally C. NEW, THE LIFE OF HENRY BROUCHAM TO 1830, at 198-227 (1961).
97 38 PARL. DEB. (2d ser.) 1219 (1818); Report of the Select Committee on Education
of the Lower Orders, in id. at 1212.
98 38 PARL. DEB. (2d ser.) 603 (1818).
99 Review, 19 Q. REV. 492,565 (1819).
100 Id. at 517.
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an unwarranted public assumption of the visitors' private "priv-
fleges."01
On the United States Supreme Court, Justice Story, at least,
was well-informed about the contours of English debate. After
the Dartmouth College case had been argued, but before it had
been decided, Daniel Webster, an attorney for Dartmouth Col-
lege, wrote Story that he had "been looking over a file of English
newspapers, in order to learn the proceedings of Parliament, at
its late session, on the subject of redressing abuses in charities."102
Webster summarized what he had found, and stated:
I think its [the Brougham Commission Bill's] history
shows, 1. That the English lawyers recognize a difference be-
tween charities having visitors, and such as have none. Indeed,
I did not observe, till lately, that the commissions, issued under
the statute of Elizabeth [Charitable Uses], do not extend to
charities with visitors. 2. I think we may see that Parliament is
not supposed to have the power of new-modelling, and direct-
ing to new uses, at its own pleasure, charitable funds, arising
from donations of individuals, and by them subjected to the
forum domesticum. 103
E. The English Law of Charitable Corporations and the Dart-
mouth College Case
In a narrow and technical sense, the English law of private
visitation was not relevant at all to the Dartmouth College
case. o4 Under English law, visitation was essentially supervisory,
to ensure compliance with existing charters, statutes, and rules,
while New Hampshire's amendment of the Dartmouth charter
was a legislative reorganization of the school, an act not even dis-
101 Id. at 517, 565.
10 2 Letter from Daniel Webster to Justice Joseph Story (Aug. 16, 1818), reprinted in
17 WRMNcS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER 286 (F. Webster ed. 1903). Webster did
not say which "newspaper" he was sending, but it was probably 19 Q. RBv. (July, 1818),
containing a Review at 492, 565. Excerpts from this review appeared in REPORT OF THE
CASE OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE AGAINST WOODWARD, supra note 3, at 395 app. Story cited
the Whig EDINBURGH RvE. twice in his Note I: On Charitable Bequests, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 3 app., 8 app n.(a) and 20 app. n.(c).
103 Letter from Daniel Webster to Justice Joseph Story, supra note 102, at 286.
104 Robbins, supra note 3, at 177-79.
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tantly analogous to visitation.
Even if the Supreme Court assumed that the royal prerog-
ative and the location of the visitatorial power as such were
somehow relevant as to whether the New Hampshire legislature
could amend the Dartmouth charter, the Court drew the wrong
conclusion from the English precedents, viewed technically, and
reached the wrong result. Dartmouth was a unitary charitable
corporation, an incorporated charitable institution with no sep-
arate visitors. The Court stated that the Dartmouth corporation
was the "assignee" of all the founder's and original donors' prop-
erty rights-' so that the founder's and original donors' "whole
legal and equitable interest" was in the corporation. 106 The Dart-
mouth corporation would thus have had the visitatorial power
incident to the founder's and donors' property. However, it was
absurd that the Dartmouth trustees should visit themselves. As
stated above, 107 the English law in such cases treated the visita-
torial power with respect to non-pecuniary matters as a branch
of the royal prerogative to be exercised for the Crown by the
Lord Chancellor. Since, as the Court held, New Hampshire suc-
ceeded at the Revolution to the "rights and obligations" of the
Crown,3 8 New Hampshire had visitatorial power over Dart-
mouth and had the power to amend the Dartmouth charter.
In a technical sense, the Supreme Court in Dartmouth Col-
lege stood the royal prerogative on its head. Because Dartmouth
was a private unitary charitable corporation, the Crown had
greater prerogative power over it than over any other type of lay
corporation. Yet the Court held that New Hampshire's authority
over Dartmouth was severely restricted by the contracts clause.
In contrast, the Crown's prerogative power over municipal and
other "public" corporations was as restricted as over any other
type of lay corporation. Yet the Court indicated that the states
had nearly full authority to regulate public corporations, 109 and
this even though the states succeeded to the rights and duties of
the Crown.
105 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 642.
106 Id. at 654.
107 See text accompanying notes 90-94 supra.
108 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 643.
109 Id. at 629-30.
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Marshall fully understood the problem which the English
law of visitation posed in the Dartmouth College case." 0 In his
opinion for the Court, he neither mentioned visitation as such
nor relied upon it as a basis for decision. In Philadelphia Baptist
Association (decided at the same term as Dartmouth College),
Marshall noted that the Crown had a "right of visitation, which
is an acknowledged branch of the prerogative,""' and questioned
how far the prerogative power of the Crown could be exercised
by American governments to establish charities.12 Marshall
probably had similar doubts concerning the location and exercise
of the prerogative power of visitation to superintend charities in
America." 3
In his concurring opinion, Justice Story not only relied upon
the English law of private visitation, but deliberately misstated it
to support the decisions. 14 In the context of a broad inquiry pur-
portedly into the rights and duties of corporations at common
law, Story declared without qualification, ignoring the unitary
corporation such as Dartmouth, that "where trustees or gover-
nors are incorporated to manage the charity, the visitatorial
power is deemed to belong to them in their corporate charac-
ter."" 5 The visitatorial discretion of the Dartmouth College trus-
110 McClellan charges that Marshall did not understand the common law rules of
contracts and corporations which were applicable to the Dartmouth College case. J.
MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 204-05 (1971). McClellan is
incorrect. Marshall's opinions in Dartmouth College, Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n, McCul-
loch, and other cases show a firm grasp of the relevant English law and, unlike Story, an
appreciation of both the extent to which American constitutional and legal institutions
were different from England's and the extent to which technical English rules should not
be taken out of context to support decisions reached on other grounds. See Trustees of Phil-
adelphia Baptist Ass'n v. Harts' Ex'rs, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 1; McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316.
11 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 39.
112 Id. at 50.
113 New York's Chancellor James Kent doubted whether the English prerogative
power of visitation existed at all in New York's chancery court. Attorney General v. Utica
Ins. Co., 2 Johns., ch. 371,388-89 (N.Y. 1817).
114 See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 673-77 (Story, J., concurring). McClellan states that
Story's opinion was "[s]olidly reasoned ... with full citation to the English commentators
and appropriate Anglo-American decisions." J. MCCLELLAN, supra note 110, at 205.
Story's opinion was not solidly reasoned, many citations were inappropriate, and inconve-
nient significant qualifications were not mentioned. See text accompanying notes 115-17
infra.
11 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 675 (Story, J., concurring). Story cited Philips v. Bury, 91
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tees "was limited only by the charter, and liable to no supervision
or control, at least, unless it was fraudulently misapplied."1 6
Partly on this basis, Story thought that the Crown could not by
virtue of its prerogative alter or amend the corporate charter
without the consent of the corporation, at least in the absence of
an expressly reserved power to do S0.17 In Story's opinion, the
logical conclusion, in light of the contract clause, was that New
Hampshire could not amend the Dartmouth charter.
Justice Washington also purported to rely upon the English
law of visitation to support the decision for Dartmouth College.
Citing Philips v. Bury,"8 which, he said, "contains all the doc-
trine of corporations connected with this point,""9 Justice Wash-
ington concluded, "[A] college, founded by an individual, or in-
dividuals, is a private charity, subject to the government and vis-
itation of the founder, and not to the unlimited control of the
government."' 120 Washington's analysis was technically superfi-
cial.
Putting aside the numbing technicalities of the common law,
one discovers an English constitutional and legal tradition of lim-
Eng. Rep. 900, 100 Eng. Rep. 186 (K.B. 1692), rev'd (H.L. 1696); Green v. Rutherforth,
27 Eng. Rep. 1144 (Ch. 1750); Attorney-General v. Middleton, 28 Eng. Rep. 210 (Ch.
1751); In re Sutton's Hospital, 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B. 1612), all weak authority. See note
93 supra. On this point he ignored such cases as King v. Master and Fellows of Saint Cath-
erine's Hall, Cambridge, 100 Eng. Rep. 991 (K.B. 1791); Ex parte Wrangham, 30 Eng.
Rep. 803 (Lord Chancellor 1802); Attorney General v. Dixie, 33 Eng. Rep. 388 (Ch.;
Lord Chancellor 1795); Eden v. Foster, 24 Eng. Rep. 750, 25 Eng. Rep. 125 (Ch. 1726).
It is unclear why Story overstated the limitations on the prerogative power over private
eleemosynary corporations. In another case, Story wrote that at the Revolution the "state
[of Virginia] itself succeeded only to the rights of the crown; and... with many a flower
of prerogative struck from its hands." Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 50 (1815).
Perhaps it was because Story stated no principle which would determine which flowers
had been stricken and which had not.
116 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 681 (Story, J., concurring). Story's statement was too
strong. The Lord Chancellor exercising the royal prerogative had jurisdiction to determine
whether the trustees properly operated the charity under the charter. He could correct for
negligent administration as well as fraudulent misapplication. And the King's Bench could
issue a mandamus to compel a visitor to act on a matter within his jurisdiction. King v.
Bishop of Ely, 100 Eng. Rep. at 183 n.a. (K.B. 1788).
117 Story was generally correct, but the limitation on the prerogative applied to all
English lay corporations, including "public" municipal corporations.
118 91 Eng. Rep. at 900,100 Eng. Rep. at 186.
119 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 659 (Washington, J., concurring).
120 Id. at 665.
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ited government which provided a loose and imperfect model for
the Court in the Dartmouth College case. Especially as a result of
the Glorious Revolution, the English had limited the prerogative
power of the Crown over all lay corporations. In common with
most of the Revolutionary generation, Marshall treated many
limitations on the Crown as salutary limitations on all govern-
mental power. However, Marshall did not ignore Parliament.
Acknowledging that the English Parliament was "omnip-
otent,"'' Marshall was exaggerating only slightly when he stated
that had Parliament annulled the Dartmouth charter immedi-
ately after its issuance in 1769, "the perfidy of the transaction
would have been universally acknowledged .... [T]he con-
tract would at that time have been deemed sacred by all."'12
The English system of private government of charitable insti-
tutions was an aspect of the broader constitutional and legal tra-
dition which was especially relevant to the Dartmouth College
case. Although the obvious need to supervise charities more ef-
fectively had forced the expansion of royal prerogative power
over private charitable institutions in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, there remained the established legal
tradition of private government of charity based on the comple-
mentary policies of encouraging the foundation of charitable in-
stitutions and of protecting existing institutions from despotic
control by the Crown. Marshall was appealing to this tradition
when he identified the foundation and funds of Dartmouth as
private, and characterized Dartmouth as a private, eleemos-
ynary corporation. ' The process of creating new corporations,
the contents of the charters, including the occasional reservation
clause, and the protected legal position of lay and especially pr-
vate eleemosynary corporations invited American analysis in
terms of contract. In Dartmouth College, Marshall essentially
adopted, or, rather, adapted the English constitutional and legal
tradition of private government of charities, based ultimately on
private property, to support the decision.
Although the English constitutional and legal tradition influ-
121 Id. at 643.
12 Id.
12 Id. at 632-34.
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enced the Court, the Dartmouth College decision and its sup-
porting analysis followed primarily from the American experi-
ence with colleges and other incorporated institutions from the
late colonial period until 1819. To that subject we now turn.
II. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE:
PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF COLLEGES
Dartmouth College concerned the relationship between gov-
ernment and religious and educational institutions in nineteenth-
century America. As Marshall framed the issue, "Is education al-
together in the hands of government?"''1 Since education and re-
ligion were closely connected, the problem of government's rela-
tion to education could not be separated from the problem of
government's relation to religion. The Marshall Court's decision
was primarily the result of the Court's assessment of the Amer-
ican experience with the founding and control of colleges from
the late colonial into the early nationalist period. The Court con-
cluded that sound public policy required a constitutional system
to pr6mote the establishment of new institutions and to accom-
modate diverse and competitive religious and political groups in
a free society.
A. Promotion
Although the American colonies began and initially grew as
religiously homogeneous societies, they became more diverse in
the middle and late eighteenth century,'21 and this trend toward
religious diversity accelerated during the early nineteenth cen-
tury.l12 The evolution from religious homogeneity to religious di-
versity affected the relationship between the state and both
'
24 Id. at 634. Marshall stated, "Almost all eleemosynary corporations, those which
are created for the promotion of religion, of charity, or of education, are of the same char-
acter. The law of this case is the law of all." Id. at 645.
125 See S. AHLSrROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 99-384, 527-
32, 572-73, (1972); G. DARGO, ROOTS OF THE REPuBLIc 77-107 (1974); E. GAUSTAD, His-
TORICAL ATLAS OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 1-36, 175 app. (rev. ed. 1976).
128 S. AHLmoM, supra note 125, at 387-509, 532-39; E. GAUSTAD, supra note 125, at
37-140 passim.
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church and education, and influenced the result in the Dart-
mouth College case.
Religiously homogeneous societies produced America's
earliest colleges-Harvard in Massachusetts, William and Mary
in Virginia, and Yale in Connecticut. 2 7 The homogeneity was re-
flected in the alliance between the colonial governments and the
established church, with church and state cooperating to create
institutions of higher education to serve social and religious
needs.
By the middle of the eighteenth century, migration between
colonies and the growth of dissenting sects had broken down the
religious homogeneity which had provided the social basis for
early American colleges. 12 The growing religious diversity weak-
ened the alliance between church and state, and forced changes
in the relationship between college and state. Attempting to rec-
oncile religious particularism and responsibilities and an increas-
ing diverse population, governments chartering colleges gave
substantial control to the religious denomination which had
founded the new institution, while requiring toleration of profes-
sors and students of diverse religious backgrounds. 12
Especially after the turn of the nineteenth century and the
beginning of the Second Great Awakening of religious enthusi-
asm, the American trend toward religious diversity accelerated,
as formerly small denominations grew rapidly, new sects and de-
nominations were created, and old denominations suffered inter-
nal conflict and division.1° New colleges were founded and oper-
ated on a much more religiously particularistic and local basis
than they had been in the late colonial period. The Presbyter-
ians, for example, who had founded Princeton in 1746 as an "in-
127 Herbst, supra note 30, at 7, 8, 11-12, 43-44; Herbst, The Eighteenth Century
Origins of the Split between Private and Public Higher Education in the United States, 15
HisT. EDUC. Q. 273, 273 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Eighteenth Century Origins]; J.
HEBST, supra note 3, at 1-47.
128 Eighteenth Century Origins, supra note 127, at 273-74.
129 Id. at 274-76; J. HERBST, supra note 3, at 63-65, 82-110. The Dartmouth charter
of 1769 made the Congregational founder, Rev. Eleazor Wheelock, president for life,
with authority to appoint his successor by will. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 529-30. However, the College was prohibited from "exclud-
ing any person of any religious denomination whatsoever... on account of his... spec-
ulative sentiments in religion." Id. at 533.
130 S. AHLSTROM, supra note 125, at 387-402, 415-54.
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tercolonial instrument of social integration and reformation,"' 3'
between 1774 and 1794 established six colleges, 32 which by 1820
had become "bastions of Presbyterian orthodoxy and important
weapons in the sectarian competition .-. . ." After Orthodox
Congregationalists founded Andover Theological Seminary in
1807 as an alternative to Unitarian Harvard,'34 the sectarian the-
ological seminary became the accepted institution for training
ministers in many Protestant denominations. 13 According to one
authority, eighteen colleges with denominational connections
were founded in America between 1780 and 1819. I'l Neither the
theological seminaries nor, with some exceptions, the new col-
leges had substantial connections with the governments of the
states in which they were founded.
Dartmouth College was decided in this context of accelerat-
ing religious division, intensifying denominational competition,
and educational particularism. As the people of the early nine-
teenth century believed that legal policy generally should decen-
tralize decision-making to encourage economic growth, 137 so the
131 H. MILLER, THE REVOLUTIONARY COLLEGE 67 (1976).
132 Id. at 124-28.
133 Id. atxx.
134 Naylor, The Theological Seminary in the Configuration of American Higher Ed-
ucation: The Ante-Bellum Years, 17 HIST. EDUC. Q. 17, 19 (1977).
135 Id. at 17.
13 6 D. TEWKSBURY, THE FOUNDING OF AMERICAN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES BE-
FORE THE CIVIL WAR 211 - 220 app. (1932). See also J. HERBST, supra note 3, at 244-53
app. Historians differ as to the extent non-public colleges founded during and after the
Revolution were connected to religious denominations. One author believes that the insti-
tutions were best characterized ecumenically as "Christian colleges." Naylor, The Ante-
Bellum College Movement: A Reappraisal of Tewkbury's Founding of American Colleges
and Universities, 13 HisT. EDUC. Q. 261,266-70 (1973). Another contends that after 1800,
new colleges were essentially local enterprises in which denominational ties were secon-
dary. Potts, American Colleges in the Nineteenth Century: From Localism to Denomina-
tionalism, 11 HisT. EDUC. Q. 363, 367-68 (1971); Potts, "College Enthusiasm" As Public
Response, 1800-1860, 47 HARv. EDuc. REv. 28 (1977). J. Herbst sees substantial diversity.
See J. HEaBST, supra note 3, at 189-205, 226-31. Whether individual colleges were denom-
inational, broadly Christian or primarily local is not too important for the Dartmouth
College case. There were some significant religious connections, and most of these institu-
tions were not the creation of the state, but were the product of voluntary, private individ-
ual and group effort.
137 See generally J. HuRST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 3-32 (1956); M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860 (1977).
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Marshall Court believed that constitutional policy should be
framed to encourage the voluntary establishment of such useful
institutions as schools and colleges. Borrowing a premise of the
Elizabethans which was still serviceable in the nineteenth cen-
tury, the Marshall Court concluded that there was a connection
between encouraging people voluntarily to found socially useful
institutions and ensuring that such institutions would not be "al-
together in the hands of government."' Marshall wrote:
These eleemosynary institutions do not fill the place,
which would otherwise be occupied by government, but that
which would otherwise remain vacant. They are complete ac-
quisitions to literature. They are donations to education; dona-
tions, which any government must be disposed rather to en-
courage than to discountenance. It requires no very critical
examination of the human mind to enable us to determine,
that one great inducement to these gifts is the conviction felt by
the giver, that the disposition he makes of them is immutable.
It is probable, that no man ever was, and that no man ever will
be, the founder of a college, believing at the time, that an act
of incorporation constitutes no security for the institution; be-
lieving, that it is immediately to be deemed a public institu-
tion, whose funds are to be governed and applied, not by the
will of the donor, but by the will of the legislature.139
In short, Dartmouth and similar institutions should be substan-
tially free from legislative controls so there would be more of
them.
After the Revolution, denominational and local groups were
not the only founders of new institutions of higher education. In
response to the growing diversity in religion and the particularis-
tic emphasis of many colleges, some states created state univer-
sities.' 40 One of these was Jefferson's University of Virginia, char-
tered by the Virginia legislature about a week before Marshall
delivered the Dartmouth College decision.'41 The legislation
138 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 518.
139 Id. at 647. Story said that makdng private charitable donations the property of
government "would extinguish all future eleemosynary endowments .... Id. at 672
(Story, J., concurring).
140 Eighteenth Century Origins, supra note 127, at 277-78; J. HERBST, supra note 3,
at 206-12; D. TEwKsBUY, supra note 136, at 167.
141 Act of Jan. 25, 1819, ch. 19, 1819 Va. Acts 15. On the founding of the University
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creating the University of Virgionia carefully provided that the
University would "in all things, and at all times, be subject to the
control of the Legislature."'42 In his opinion in Dartmouth Col-
lege, Marshall, not wishing to discourage the development of
state schools while encouraging the founding of private ones, ac-
knowledged "[t]hat there may be an [educational] institution
founded by government, and placed entirely under its immediate
control . .. .,1
B. Protection
The proper relationship between state governments and
existing colleges, most of which had religious connections, was
the principal constitutional question addressed by Dartmouth
College. The problem had become increasingly acute as the
growing religious and political diversity in America from the late
colonial and into the early national period produced many con-
flicts between governments and colleges. This subsection notes
most of these controversies,' and reviews in some detail the con-
flict between New Hampshire and Dartmouth, and controversies
over William and Mary in Virginia, Harvard in Massachusetts,
and Columbia in New York. The review shows the nature and
scope of the constitutional problem as seen by the Supreme
Court, and leads to the conclusion that the Court in Dartmouth
College was protecting institutions from democratic majorities,
of Virginia, see generally, P. BRUCE, HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA 65-233
(1920); 6 D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND His TIME 233-82, 365-425 (1981).
142 Act of Jan. 25, 1819, ch. 19, § 9, 1819 Va. Acts 15, 17.
143 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 634.
144 The literature on the relationship between legislatures and colleges in the late co-
lonial and early national periods is large, but scattered. The most detailed treatments are
individual college histories and biographies of leading figures. Only a few works focus di-
rectly on the problem. J. HERBST, supra note 3, is the best, although some interpretive
force is lost in the kaleidoscopic detail. Herbst does not seem to understand the significance
of the private visitor in the English system. J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 3, surveys Colum-
bia, Dartmouth, Harvard and Yale from 1776 to 1876. The author's thesis, that "a distinc-
tion between private and public or state institutions was not commonly recognized before
the Civil War," id. at 4-5, is untenable. See also W. Smith, The Relations of College and
State in Colonial America (1949) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Columbia University);
R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE
UNITED STATES (1955).
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thus separating state from church, and advancing religious and
educational liberty.
The question of the constitutional and legal status of the Col-
lege of William and Mary was debated in Virginia from the
1770's until 1819 and beyond. This particular issue was an aspect
of the larger problem of the nature and extent of the state's role
in the promotion and control of higher education in Virginia.
The College of William and Mary was founded by royal
charter issued on February 8, 1693145 at the solicitation of the Vir-
ginia Assembly. 46 The institution clearly enjoyed a "public"
foundation, as the King and Queen made an initial grant of
20,000 acres of land and of receipts from certain quit rents, taxes,
and fees. 147 The charter named a number of persons and their
successors "to be the true, sole and undoubted Visitors and Gov-
ernors of the ... College," with "full and absolute... power"
to make "statutes" for the institution,148 and created a close insti-
tutional connection with the established Anglican Church. 49 The
Virginia Assembly supplemented the original financial support
with additional funding and specific appropriations throughout
the colonial period. 1
During the Revolution, education and educational institu-
tions, as almost everything else in Virginia, were considered for
reform. Thomas Jefferson's proposals for educational reform
were contained in draft bills 79, 80, and 81 of the Report of the
Committee of Revisors of the laws,'5' submitted to the General
14S Charter of William and Mary, reprinted in H. HARTWELL, J. BLAIR, & E.'
CHILTON, THE PRESENT STATE OF VIRGINIA, AND THE COLLEGE 72 (London 1727). On the
founding and government of William and Mary, see J. HERBST, supra note 3, at 29-37.
146 H. ADAMS, THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY 14-15 (U.S. Bureau of Educa-
tion Circulars of Information No. 1, 1887); Bridge, The Rev. John Bracken v. The Visitors
of William and Mary College: A Post-Revolutionary Problem in Visitatorial Jurisdiction,
20 WM. & MARY L. REv. 415,416 (1979); J. HERBST, supra note 3, at 30-31.
147 Charter of William and Mary §§ 14, 15, 16, reprinted in H. HARTWELL, J. BLAIR,
& E. CHILTON, supra note 145, at 86-92.
148 Id. § 9, at 81-82.
149 H. ADAMS, supra note 146, at 18-19.
150 Id. at 15, 20.
151 COMMITTEE OF REVISORS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF REVISORS APPOINTED BY
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA IN M. DCC, LXX, V I (1784), reprinted in 2 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 526, 535, 544 (J. Boyd ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON].
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Assembly on June 18, 1779.152 Bill No. 80 was "for Amending the
Constitution of the College of William and Mary, and Substitut-
ing More Certain Revenues for Its Support."'' Jefferson pro-
posed the severance of the close ties between the college and the
Anglican Church, and the remodeling of William and Mary into
a state-controlled, fully state-supported institution. 5 4
The long preamble to Bill No. 80, however, is more impor-
tant here than the details of the proposed reform. Jefferson, an-
ticipating opposition to his bill on the legal grounds that the col-
lege was a "private" institution not subject to legislative control,
made the preamble a detailed legal brief, sans citations, for the
proposition that William and Mary was a public institution sub-
ject to public direction. 15
Jefferson's bill failed to pass the legislature.5 5 Because Wil-
liam and Mary was so closely connected with the Anglican
Church, Virginia Presbyterians and other dissenters opposed
state aid to the institution.'15 In addition, according to Jefferson,
sectional interests contributed to the defeat of the bill. l5,
Although Bill No. 80 failed to pass the Virginia legislature,
Jefferson was able to accomplish some of his reforms by other
means. In 1779, he was elected one of the visitors of William and
Mary and in that capacity succeeded in abolishing the college's
grammar school and in reorganizing the curriculum and profes-
sorships. 159
152 J. Boyd, Editorial Note, 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 151, at
307.
153 2THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 151, at 535.
1 For a discussion of Jefferson's proposals with respect to William and Mary, see id.
at 542. For a discussion of the position of William and Mary in Virginia, see Thompson,
The Reform of the College of William and Mary, 1763-1780, 115 PROc. AM. PHIL. SOGY
187, 188, 201-05, 207-085 (1971).
1,5 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 151, at 535-39; Thompson,
supra note 154, at 207-08. Jefferson was fully aware of the legal argument, so far as it de-
rived from English law. See Godwin v. Lunan, Jefferson's Reports 96, 100-02 (Va. Gen.
Ct. 1771) (Jefferson's argument).
"6 J. Boyd, supra note 152, at 543.
157 Thompson, supra note 154, at 208-09; T. JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1821), re-
printed in 1 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3, 75-76 (P. Ford ed. 1904) [hereinafter
cited as T. JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOcRAPHY]; J. HERBST, supra note 3, at 185.
158 T. JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 157, at 76.
15' Thompson, supra note 154, at 209-11; T. JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note
157, at 78.
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The abolition of the grammar school produced the case of
Bracken v. Visitors of William and Mary College.lse The dis-
placed teacher, Reverend John Bracken, 16 brought suit to chal-
lenge the authority of the college visitors to abolish his job. The
case was adjourned to the court of appeals "on account of diffi-
-culty,"'162 where it was heard late in 1790. The college hired John
Marshall, then a competent young attorney, to defend its "Jeffer-
sonian" reform.
At the outset, Marshall challenged the jurisdiction of the
court on the grounds that William and Mary was "a mere Elee-
mosynary institution, with Visitors appointed for its govern-
ment."' 1  The court interrupted Marshall to stipulate that the
court would not have jurisdiction if the college were a "private
Eleemosynary institution," but the court wanted to hear argu-
ment on the college's status. 14 Admitting that the college was
founded on donations from the king and the government, Mar-
shall insisted, on the authority of Philips v. Bury and other Eng-
lish cases, that the college was "private" anyway.' The crucial
point was that William and Mary had appointed visitors to
superintend their charity. Once these were appointed, the corpo-
ration was in the same class with "private Eleemosynary" corpo-
rations founded by individuals, and the Virginia court could
have no jurisdiction over removals within the Visitor's power. 1
Marshall's argument was designed to serve two purposes.
First, it was calculated to advance the immediate interests of his
16 7 Va. (3 Call) 573 (1790). The best treatment of Bracken is Bridge, supra note
146. See also Bartosic, With John Marshall from William and Mary to Dartmouth Col-
lege, 7 WM. & MARY L. REv. 259 (1966); Swindler, Another Early College Charter Case,
1971 Y.B. SuP. CT. HIST. SOCY 38; C. Cullen and H. Johnson, Editorial Note, 2 THE
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 67 (C. Cullen and H. Johnson ed. 1977); J. HERBST, supra note
3, at 219-20.
161 On Bracken, see Goodwin, The Reverend John Bracken (1745-1818), 10 HIsT.
MAGAZINE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH 354 (1941).
162 7 Va. (3 Call) at 579.
13 Id. at 580.
1I d.
'
6 5 Id. at 580, 591-94. Marshall relied upon King v. Bishop of Ely, 96 Eng. Rep. 39
(K.B. 1757); King v. Bishop of Chester, 96 Eng. Rep. 12 (K.B. 1732); Bentley v. Epise'
Eliens, 93 Eng. Rep. 936 (K.B. 1732); Philips v. Bury, 91 Eng. Rep. 900, 90 Eng. Rep.
469 (K.B. 1694).
16 7 Va. (3 Call) at 580, 591-94.
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client, William and Mary, which wanted primarily to avoid a
judgment in favor of Bracken. If the court decided it did not have
jurisdiction'the college would win, regardless of the merits of the
case. Second, and more broadly, Marshall was offering a rebut-
tal to Jefferson's contention that the college was a fully public in-
stitution and was asking the court to declare it had the same in-
dependence as a private corporation.
According to Edmund Pendleton, the President of the Court
of Appeals, a majority of the judges thought that William and
Mary "had a public and not a private foundation." 167 Although
Pendleton did not elaborate, the close involvement of the Vir-
ginia Assembly in the founding of the college may have been cru-
cial. The English law of private charitable corporations relied
upon by Marshall might extend to royal foundations, but perhaps
did not embrace a corporation originally sponsored and contin-
ually supported by the Virginia legislature. Since William and
Mary was public, the Virginia courts had jurisdiction to decide
the case and others which might arise. On the merits, the court
decided that the 'visitors had power to remove the grammar
school teacher, so Bracken had no legal grounds for complaint. 1 1
If Marshall failed to fulfill his secondary goal of having the col-
lege declared to be as free from government control as private
corporations, he at least won his case.
It is difficult to assess the ultimate impact of the Bracken case
on Marshall's Dartmouth College opinion. At least, the case ed-
167 Bracken v. William and Mary College, 5 Va. (1 Call) 161, 163-64 (1797).
168 7 Va. (3 Call) at 599. Bridge argues that, contrary to the decision of the Virginia
Court of Appeals, William and Mary's Visitors exceeded their authority under the charter
and original statutes when they abolished the grammar school. Bridge, supra note 146, at
429-33, 435, 438. However, the charter, § 9, reprinted in H. HARTWELL, J. BLAIR & E.
CHILTON, supra note 145, at 81, made the visitors not only visitors but also "governors,"
with discretionary authority to make "statutes," which can certainly be construed to per-
mit any reorganization not inconsistent with the charter itself. Bridge also contends that
Bracken's counsel made the fundamental errors of arguing that William and Mary was a
public corporation and of seeking mandamus instead of prohibition. Bridge, supra note
146, at 435-38. However, the Virginia court accepted Bracken's counsel's argument that
William and Mary was public. The court denied the writ not because mandamus was the
wrong writ, but because the court concluded that the Visitors were within their authority.
A prohibition would have been denied on the same ground. Had Bracken been entitled to
a remedy, mandamus was the, or at least a, proper writ. Dominus Rex v. Ballivos de Mor-
pett, 93 Eng. Rep. 383 (K.B. 1717).
[Vol. 70
THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE
ucated Marshall as to the jurisdictional nature of the visitatorial
power, and as to the necessity of finding other, stronger grounds
upon which to base a constitutional limitation on the legislature.
The Chief Justice did not mention visitation at all in his Dart-
mouth College opinion. Beyond this, it seems that Marshall took
to heart the Virginia court's focus on the nature of the foundation
as the major element. Dartmouth College was private because its
funds were private, not because special governors were ap-
pointed.' By the same token, the Bracken decision stood even
after the Dartmouth College decision. William and Mary was
public because its foundation was public. 170
In a larger sense, Marshall saw that the prolonged contro-
versy over William and Mary did nothing positive for the school,
for education, for government, for Anglicans, or for dissenters.
The claim that William and Mary was public threatened legisla-
tive attack along the lines proposed by Jefferson. If the school's
Anglican and local supporters fully endowed the school, the leg-
islature might simply expropriate it for the public. On the other
hand, William and Mary's existing sectarian and otherwise nar-
rowly local base restrained the penurious Jeffersonian legislature
from actively supporting the school. Not surprisingly, William
and Mary languished in the early decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury, as Jefferson moved on to urge, successfully, the founding of
the University of Virginia.' 7'
Unlike Justices Story and Livingston, Chief Justice Marshall
apparently had only minimal connections with educational insti-
tutions after he became a member of the Supreme Court. He had
attended the lectures of Professor George Wythe at William and
Mary for about twelve weeks in 1780.172 In 1803, the Virginia leg-
islature named him, along with many other leading citizens of
169 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 633-34.
170 In his Dartmouth College opinion, Justice Washington distinguished "between
the different kinds of lay aggregate corporations, in order to prevent any implied decision
by this court of any other case, than the one immediately before it." 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at
659. Washington, who was from Virginia, was probably distinguishing the legally "pub-
lic" William and Mary and the newly-founded University of Virginia from the "private"
Dartmouth.
171 See text accompanying notes 141-42supra.
172 1 A. BEVERIDCE, THE LiFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 154-60 (1916).
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Richmond, a trustee of the Richmond Academy, 73 and in 1807
named him a trustee of the Hallerian Academy.174 Four of Mar-
shall's five sons attended Harvard, 75 from which Marshall him-
self received an honorary degree in 1806.176 He also received
honorary degrees from Princeton in 1802,177 and the University of
Pennsylvania in 1815.17
Harvard College, founded in Massachusetts in 1636,179 was
the oldest college in the country. Throughout the colonial period
it had a close institutional and working relationship with the
Massachusetts provincial government,' and for this reason
could realistically be classified as a public institution. 1' The state
constitution of 1780 sought to preserve governmental control
over Harvard by providing that the legislature might alter the
college government "in as full a manner as might have been done
by the Legislature of the late Province of Massachusetts Bay."'8 2
The constitution also confirmed the historic division of Harvard's
administrative authority between the President and Fellows,
known colloquially as "the Corporation," and a Board of Over-
seers, 1 which had some legislative functions as well as a superin-
tending authority roughly analogous to the visitatorial power.
After the turn of the nineteenth century, as Harvard went
Federalist in politics and Unitarian in religion, 1' a controversy
arose concerning the membership of the Board of Overseers. Tra-
ditionally, the Board had been composed of certain government-
al officers, including the Massachusetts Senate, and Congrega-
tional clergymen of various towns."" In 1810, however, princi-
173 Act of Dec. 29, 1803, ch. 22, § 1, 1803 Va. Acts 28.
174 Act of Jan. 6, 1807, ch. 83, § 1, 1806 Va. Acts 33.
175 4 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 172, at 73.
176 Id. at 89.
177 Id. Marshall's eldest son attended Princeton. Id. at 73.
178 Id. at 89.
179 S. MORISON, THREE CENTURIES OF HARVARD 1636-1936, at 5 (1936).
180 Id. at 5-146 passim; J. HERBST, supra note 3, at 5-28, 49-55, 150-51. For official
actions in regard to Harvard's government during the colonial period, see 1 J. QUINCY,
THE HISTORY OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY 586 app.-612 app. (Boston 1860).
181 j. HERBST, supra note 3, at 8.
182 MASS. CONST. of 1780, Pt. 2, ch. 5, § 1, art. III.
18 Id.
184 S. MORISON, supra note 179, at 187-91; J. HERBST, supra note 3, at 213.
185 2J. QuINcY, supra note 180, at 294.
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pally in order to preserve Federalist control of the Board, 18 6 the
Federalist legislature greatly reduced the number of ex officio po-
sitions and provided for the election of fifteen laymen by the
Board itself. 187 As required by the Act,' the Board and Corpora-
tion accepted the change. 89 Predictably, the new Board was al-
most exclusively Federalist.19°
Predictably, too, the new board came under attack with the
ascendance of the Republicans. When the Republican legislature
proposed to repeal the "reform" of the Overseers, the Federalist
Corporation announced its opposition' 91 and appointed The-
ophilus Parsons, a leading Federalist and Chief Justice of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court, to prepare a memorial challeng-
ing the legislative authority to repeal the 1810 act. 92 Later,
Jeremiah Smith, a leading attorney for Dartmouth College, used
Parsons' memorial in the preparation of his case, 193 and excerpts
appeared in Farrar's Report. 194
Parsons' argument was very. simple. He admitted that tech-
nically the General Court had not founded Harvard as a private
college, 'I but contended that the Assembly had surrendered its
legislative authority over the institution to the Corporation and
its visitatorial power to the Board of Overseers. 9 6 Although the
General Court could alter the Harvard government with the con-
sent of the Corporation and Overseers, 17 it could not unilaterally
make an alteration because such a change would impair the
vested rights of Overseers and adversely affect the Harvard Cor-
poration.'1 All changes wrought in the past by the provincial
18 S. MORISON, supra note 179, at 212; J. HERBST. supra note 3, at 213.
1 7 Act of March 6, 1810, ch. 113, §§ 1, 2, 1810 Mass. Acts 200, 200-01.
188 Id. § 6, at 2 0 2 .
189 2J. QuINCY,supra note 180, at 295-96.
190 S. MoRIsoN, supra note 179, at 212.
1912 J. QuINCY, supra note 180, at 301.
192 T. PARSONS, MEMOIR OF THEOPHILUS PARSONS, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME JU-
DICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS; WITH NOTICES OF HIS CONTEMPORARIES 291-92 (Boston
1859).
193 J. SHIRLEY, supra note 3, at 168.
194 REPORT OF THE CASE OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE AGAINST WOODWARD, supra note
3, at 397 app.
195 J. SHIRLEY, supra note 3, at 169-70.
19 Id. at 171.




General Court were with the consent of the Harvard authorities
or were arbitrary legislative dictations.20 Consequently, the
present legislature had no authority to restore the pre-1810 ar-
rangement over the opposition of the Corporation and the Over-
seers. MO,
The Republicans, however, relying on the colonial prece-
dents, repealed the 1810 act on February 29, 1812,20 1 thus restor-
ing the traditional membership of the Overseers. The Harvard
Corporation and Overseers formally rejected this act, on the
grounds that the legislature could not change the visitatorial
power without consent of those affected. 202 Nonetheless, the 1810
Board voted that it was "not disposed to bring its rights to the test
of judicial decision ' 203 and surrendered to the reconstituted
Board.2 In 1814, the matter came to a close with the repassage
of the 1810 reform, the addition of the Senate to the Board of
Overseers,2 and formal acceptance of the new act by the Corpo-
ration and Board.206
In the end, the partisan battle for control of the Harvard
Board of Overseers had proved to be an exercise in enervating fu-
tility, contributing nothing of lasting benefit to Harvard, educa-
tion, government, or to either political party, except the durable
settlement which ended the controversy.
Joseph Story of Massachusetts was closely connected to most
of these events. He had graduated from Harvard in 1798.m A Re-
publican, he was Speaker of the Massachusetts House in 1811
and 1812 when the legislature was considering the proposal to re-
peal the Federalists' 1810 reform of Harvardm and, on his way to
the Supreme Court, he gave his farewell address just before the
'99 Id. at 171.
2 Id. at 174.
201 Act of Feb. 29, 1812, ch. 157, § 1, 1812 Mass. Acts 593, 593. The Act had no pro-
vision conditioning effectiveness on acceptance by the Corporation or Board.
202 2 J. QUINCY, supra note 180, at 302, 303.
203 Id. at 303.
24 S. MORISON, supra note 179, at 213.
205 Act of Feb. 28, 1814, ch. 194, §§ 1, 2, 1814 Mass. Acts 469, 469-70.
206 2 J. QUINCY, supra note 180, at 304.
207 G. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT 25-26
(1970).
208 Id. at 81-82.
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passage of the 1812 Republican reform.m In April, 1818, about a
month after the arguments and almost a year before the decision
in Dartmouth College, Story was named a member of the Har-
vard Board of Overseers.2 10
If there were any doubt as to where his sympathies lay,
Story's election as a Harvard Overseer settled the matter. In his
concurring opinion in Dartmouth College, Story stated that he
would extend the federal contracts clause far beyond the narrow
limits set forth in the opinion of the Court to provide substantial
protection even for such publicly-founded institutions as Har-
vard. The federal Constitution, wrote Story, should protect all
state grants of funds to hospitals and colleges, whether the grants
were "for special or general purposes, for public charity or par-
ticular beneficence."211 Nor would Story limit constitutional pro-
tection to contracts respecting property in the strict sense. 212 The
contracts clause reached all contracts concerning "immunities,
dignities, offices or franchises, or other rights deemed valuable in
law,"213 including contracts "for the exercise of mere author-
ity."214 "Each trustee," wrote Story, "has a vested right, and a
legal interest, in his office, and it cannot be divested but by due
course of law. '"2 15 Had Story's opinion been law, the Republicans'
1812 modification of the Harvard Board of Overseers would
probably have been an unconstitutional impairment of the obli-
gation of contracts.
Story wanted to convert the federal contracts clause into a
general substantive due process clause to protect both public and
private institutions not only because of the governmental threat
to Harvard, but more generally because he feared what the post-
War of 1812 politicians, soon to be Jacksonians, might do in soci-
ety. In March, 1818, a few days after the argument in Dart-
209 Id. at 82.
210 Id. at 171. In August, 1818, Harvard granted LL.D.'s to Justices Brockholst Liv-
ingston and William Johnson. Id.
211 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 697 (Story, J., concurring).
212 Id. at 698 (Story, J., concurring).
213 Id. at 699 (Story, J., concurring).
214 Id. at 700 (Story, J., concurring).
2 15 Id. at 705 (Story, J., concurring). Story stated that the corporate trustees had
"rights and privileges... collectively and separately." Id. at 703 (Story, J., concurring).
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mouth College, Story expressed his anxiety to an old acquain-
tance:
[A] new race of men is springing up to govern the nation; they
are the hunters after popularity, men ambitious, not of the
honor, so much as of the profits of office,-the demagogues
whose principles hang laxly upon them, and who follow not so
much what is right, as what leads to a temporary vulgar ap-
plause. There is great, very great danger that these
men ... will rule the nation; and if so, we may yet live to see
many of our best institutions crumble in the dust.216
All of the "best institutions" were not private, and Story would
have used the federal contracts clause to protect even public in-
stitutions administering public property from rapacious legisla-
tures.
New York's Columbia College, known as King's College in
the colonial period, was born in acrimony in the middle of the
eighteenth century.217 During a decade-long debate which led to
the creation of the new institution, a faction led by Presbyterian
lawyer William Livingston, father of future Supreme Court Jus-
tice Brockholst Livingston, loudly advocated a fully secular, gov-
ernmentally-supported and controlled college.218 The Anglicans
and their allies, however, finally secured a charter in 1754.219
About two-thirds of the self-perpetuating Board of Governors
were Anglican laymen,m and the President of the College was re-
quired to be a member of the Church of England.2 1 The charter
gave the governors full authority to administer and to "visit" the
college and guaranteed that no one else would do any "Visita-
216 Letter from Joseph Story to Ezekiel Bacon (Mar. 12, 1818), reprinted in 1 LIFE
AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, AND PROFESSOR OF LAW AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY 311 (W. Story ed. 1851).
217 On the early history of Columbia, see D. HUMPHREY, FROM KING'S COLLEGE TO
COLUMBIA, 1746-1800 (1976); McAnear, American Imprints Concerning King's College,
44 PAPERS BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SoC'Y AM. 301 (1950); J. HEARST, supra note 3, at 97-110, 137-
41, 167-69, 222.
218 D. HUMPHREY, supra note 217, at 40-43.
219 Id. at 34-35, 47-52; THE CHARTER OF THE COLLEGE OF NEW YORK, IN AMERICA,
supra note 89; THE ADDITIONAL CHARTER GRANTED TO THE GOVERNORS OF THE COLLEGE
OF NEW YORK, IN AMERICA (New York 1754).
220 D. HUMPHREY, supra note 217, at 77.
221 THE CHARTER OF THE COLLEGE OF NEW YORK, I.N AMERICA, supra note 89, at 4.
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tion, Act or Thing... concerning the... College .... "2 2
The institution was organized principally with funds raised by
legislatively-sponsored public lotteries,m a legislative appropri-
ation of £500 per year for seven years after 1754,m and a grant of
land from the established Anglican Trinity Church in New York
City.=
In 1784, new men who came to power in New York as a re-
sult of the Revolution seized control of King's. In response to the
group identifying itself as governors of King's College,m the leg-
islature created the Regents of the State of New York, and gave
them comprehensive control over secondary and higher educa-
tion in New York, including control over King's, now renamed
Columbia.
Because the Regents were ineffective,m the legislature re-
formed the system in 1787.m The new Regents of the University
of the State of New York were given authority to incorporate and
inspect both academies and colleges, the latter of which would
be organized and controlled by individual self-perpetuating
boards of trustees enjoying all the rights of Columbia College. M
The 1787 act "absolutely ratified and confirmed" Columbia's
original 1754 charter,23' settling Columbia's status as a New York
City institution under private, not public, control. 32 The re-
-zId. at 11.
D. HUMPHREY, supra note 217, at 3, 12, 46, 65; McAnear, supra note 217, at 303,
315,334.
22 D. HUMPHREY, supra note 217, at 46; McAnear, supra note 217, at 315.
= D. HUMPHREY, supra note 217, at 49; THE CHARTER OF THE COLLEGE OF NEW
YORK, IN AMERICA, supra note 89, at 3.
M D. HUMPHREY, supra note 217, at 271; The Petition of the Subscribers Governors
of the College commonly called King's College (March 24, 1784), reprinted in D. PRATT,
ANNALS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 673 (UNIVERSITY OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK, EIGHTY-NINTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE RECENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY 1876).
2 Act of May 1, 1784, ch. 51, 1784 N.Y. Laws 686; D. HUMPHREY, supra note 217,
at 271-73. On the creation of the Regents, see S. SHERWOOD, THE UNIVERSITY OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK 50-52 (U.S. Bureau of Education Circular of Information No. 3,
1900); F. ABBOTT, GOVERNMENT POLICY AND HIGHER EDUCATION 8-11 (1958).
M F. ABBOTT, supra note 227, at 12; D. HUMPHREY, supra note 217, at 275-77; S.
SHERWOOD. supra note 227, at 58.
2 Act of April 13, 1787, ch. 82, 1787 N.Y. Laws 524; D. HUMPHREY, supra note
217, at 277-78.
230 Act of April 13, 1787, ch. 82, 1787 N.Y. Laws 524, 525-26.
231 Id. at 526.
232 D. HUMPHREY, supra note 217, at 278.
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formed board was composed exclusively of New York City res-
idents. There were no ex officio members, and Episcopalians be-
gan to regain some of the authority in the board which they had
lost during the revolution.M
Although the legislature often made sizable grants to Colum-
bia between 1787 and 1819,2M many New Yorkers were unhappy
with the college's nearly autonomous existence as an urban, elite
school. In 1807, the control of Columbia became a subject of
party and factional contention. The Republican party was split
between Livingstonians and Clintonians.23 The Livingstonian
Republicans combined with Federalists and began removing
Clintonian Republicans from office 36 Many Livingstonians de-
serted to the Clintonians, and the Clintonians, now in control of
the legislature, counter-attacked.23 One object of the counter-at-
tack was Columbia College, whose board was dominated by
Federalistsm but one of whose important members, Treasurer
(and U.S. Supreme Court Justice) Brockholst Livingston39 was a
leader of the Livingstonian Republicans. Columbia was con-
demned as a relic of royalty and out of place in a democratic soci-
ety.240 In response to an ill-timed request from the Columbia trus-
tees for certain alterations in their charter, 241 the legislature
passed an act which would have brought Columbia under the
control of the state. 24 2 Future vacancies on the Board of Trustees
would be filled by the legislatively-appointed Regents, instead of
233 Id. at 279.
234 E. HOBSON, EDUCATIONAL LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE STATE OF
NEW YORK FROM 1777 TO 1850, at 145-50 (1918).
2 1 J. HAMMOND, THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
FROM THE RATIFICATION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION TO DECEMBER, 1840, at 224-35
(4th ed. Buffalso 1850).
23" Id. at 238.2 37 Id.
238 R. ERNST, RUFUS KING, AMERICAN FEDERALIST 296 (1968).
239 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY OFFICERS AND ALUMNI, 1754-1857, at 18 (M. Thomas ed.
1936).
240 R. ERNST, supra note 238, at 298-99.
241 Van Amringe, King's College and Columbia College, in A HISTORY OF COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY, 1754-1904; PUBLISHED IN COMMEMORATION OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIF-
TIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF KING'S COLLEGE 85-86 (B. Mathews ed. 1904).
242 A. STREET, THE COUNCIL OF REVISION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK; ITS HISTORY,
A HISTORY OF THE COURTS WITH WHICH ITS MEMBERS WERE CONNECTED; BIOGRAPHICAL
SKETCHES OF ITS MEMBERS; AND ITS VETOES 344 (Albany 1854).
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by the remaining trustees. m
The New York Council of Revision, 2" composed of the Liv-
ingstonian Republicans Governor Morgan Lewis and state Su-
preme Court Justice Smith Thompson, and the Federalist Chief
Justice James Kent,2A vetoed the amendment2 6 In his opinion
for the Council, Kent admitted that the legislative interference
with the college might be justified by some "strong public neces-
sity."2 7 However, there was no such necessity in the present
case,24 and the objectionable amendment was made without the
consent of the corporation.24 "It is a sound principle in free gov-
ernments," wrote Kent, "that charters of incorporation, whether
granted for private or local, or charitable, or literary or religious
purposes, were not to be affected without due process of law, or
without the consent of the parties concerned." The New York
Senate voted to override the Council's veto, but the Clintonians
could not muster the necessary votes in the House.251
Columbia got its revised charter in 1810,252 without the ob-
jectionable provisions, but attempts to compromise the college's
independence continued. In 1817, Governor Daniel Tompkins
launched a public campaign to persuade the Columbia trustees
to cut its ties with the Episcopalian Trinity Church2" and merge
with Washington College, a recently-chartered and inadequate-
ly-endowed institution.2- The campaign grew out of the Gover-
nor's efforts to develop his land on Staten Island. m He proposed
243 Id.
244 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. III. The Council of Revision was composed of the gov-
ernor, chancellor, and any two or more members of the supreme court. It could veto legis-
lation, but the bill could be passed over the Council's veto by a two-thirds majority of each
house. Id.
24 A. STREET, supra note 242, at 344.24Id.
27 A. STmEET, supra note 242., at 345.
24Id.
249 Id. at 344.
2  Id. at 345.25I1d.
252 Act of Mar. 23, 1810, ch. 85, 1810 N.Y. Public Laws 34.
253 J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 3, at 28.
254 R. IRWIN, DANIEL D. TOMPKINS 214-15 (1968); F. HOUGH, HISTORICAL AND STA-
TISTICAL RECORD OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK DURING THE CENTURY
FROM 1784 TO 1884, at 360-61 (1885).
255 R. IRnIN, supra note 254, at 213.
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to found a partially state-supported college on his land in order to
promote rapid development of the area, and he got a charter for
Washington College for this purpose from the Board of Re-
gents2 56 However, aside from the land, the Governor's new insti-
tution had neither endowment nor operating funds 6 7 For these,
the Governor looked to Columbia. Printed petitions objecting to
the maintenance of a college in Manhattan and extolling Staten
Island as an ideal location for an educational institution were cir-
culated and submitted to the Board of Regents.25 Obligingly, the
Regents voted to ask the Columbia trustees to merge with Wash-
ington College.259 Tompkins, as it might be expected, notified
Columbia that the Regents' recommendation had his enthusiastic
support.2 ,60 After extensive deliberation, however, a special com-
mittee of Columbia trustees rejected the proposal.26 1 It would
not, the committee said, be "consistent with the Duty of Faithful
Trustees, and necessary for the Advancement of Literature and
Science" to unite with the new college. 2 The Columbia trustees
unanimously concurred with its special committees.M Justice
Brockholst Livingston, now both Treasurer and Chairman of the
Board of Columbia, 2 4 personally informed Tompkins of the trus-
tees' decision.268 Neither the Governor nor the Regents took fur-
ther action. Columbia retained its connection with the Trinity
Church 2 6 and remained haughtily independent on Manhattan,
while Washington College came to an early end.2
Justice Brockholst Livingston, appointed to the United States
Supreme Court in 1806,218 was in the center of all these events.
25 Id. at 214-16; F. HOUGH, supra note 254, at 361.
257 R. IRWIN, supra note 254, at 216.
m Id. at 215-16; F. HOUGH, supra note 254, at 360-61.
259 R. IRWIN, supra note 254, at 217; F. HOUGH, supra note 254, at 362.
260 R. IRWIN, supra note 254; at 217.
261 Id.
262 Van Amringe, supra note 241, at 104.
263 Id.
264 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY OFFICERS AND ALUMNI, 1754-1857, supra note 239, at 17,
18.
M R. IRWIN, supra note 254, at 217-18.
266J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 3, at 29.
267 R. IRWIN, supra note 254, at 218.
268 Dunne, Brockholst Livingston, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SU-
PREME COURT 1789-1969, at 391 (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969).
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He had been named to the New York Board of Regents in the
original act of 1784m and was chosen treasurer at the first meet-
ing.2 0 The act of 1787 transferred him from the Regents to the
Columbia board of trustees, 27 ' where he served as treasurer from
1787 on. 272 In 1816, he was elected chairman of the board and
held this post along with his treasurer's job until his death in
1823.w3
Livingston thus had more experience and a greater personal
interest in college administration and the relationship between
college and state than any other Justice when Dartmouth College
came before the Supreme Court. After all, he had been working
for decades to keep Columbia out of the hands of the New York
legislature and the Regents. Leaving Columbia subject to parti-
san contention, sectarian jealousies, and politicians' entrepre-
neurial ambitions had produced endless trouble and nothing pos-
itive for Columbia or the government. As treasurer and chair-
man of the board of the publicly-founded Columbia, Livingston
agreed with Story that constitutional protection ought to be ex-
tended not only to privately-founded but also to publicly-
founded educational institutions. 27 4
Many other conflicts arose between college and government-
al authorities in the late colonial and early national period. In the
middle of the eighteenth century, Yale's President Thomas Clapp
M Act of May 1, 1784, ch. 51, 1784 N.Y. Laws 686, 687.
270 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY OFFICERS AND ALUMNI, 1754-1857, supra note 239, at 9,
10; Van Amringe, supra note 241, at 61; Minutes of the Regents (May 5, 1784), reprinted
in D. PRATT, supra note 226, at 684.
271 Act of April 13, 1787, ch. 82, 1787 N.Y. Laws 524, 527.
272 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY OFFICERS AND ALUMNI, 1754-1857, supra note 239, at 18.
273 Id. at 17.
274 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 666 (Story,
J., concurring). Before the opening of the 1819 term, Story sent Livingston a copy of his
opinion in the Dartmouth College case. Livingston replied that he hoped it would be
adopted "without alteration." Letter from Brockholst Livingston to Joseph Story (Jan. 24,
1819), reprinted in 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SU-
PREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND DANE PROFESSOR OF LAW AT HARVARD UNIVER-
SITY, supra note 216, at 323. Livingston had prepared an opinion but did not publish it.
Letter from Henry Wheaton to Timothy Farrar (Aug. 2, 1819), reprinted in J. SHIRLEY,
supra note 3, at 296; G. DUNNE, supra note 207, at 179. Beveridge surmised that Living-
ston was "influenced" by the opinion of New York's Chancellor James Kent on Dartmouth
College. 4 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 172, at 257. Unless it is assumed that Livingston was




consolidated control over the institution 75 and over time man-
aged to anger just about all major factions in Connecticut. 86
When it was proposed that the legislature visit the college,m
Clap responded that Yale had been privately founded, 278 which
was probably incorrect,2 79 and that therefore the legislature had
no authority to visit the institution. 280 Religious and secular fac-
tionalism continued to disturb relations between Yale and the
Connecticut legislature until 1792281 when a durable compromise
settlement was reached. 82 In 1795, Zephaniah Swift, Connecti-
cut's future Chief Justice,m became the first to define the pecu-
liarily American category of "private corporations," identifying
Yale and two Connecticut banks as "private corporations" which
the legislature could not dissolve except through the courts. 8
During the Revolution, the Pennsylvania legislature, con-
trolled by the radical Constitutionalist party, led in part by Pres-
byterians, removed all the officials of the College, Academy and
Charity School of Philadelphia, who were predominantly Angli-
cans and suspected Loyalists, replacing the Anglican with a Pres-
byterian provost.8 The deposed officials never accepted the
charter amendment and worked for a decade to secure the resto-
ration of the old charter.26 They made common cause with the
275 L. TUCKER, PURITAN PROTAGONIST 64-65, 72-74 (1962).
276 Id. at 114-200; J. HERBST, supra note 3, at 66-81.
277 L. TUCKER, supra note 275, at 203; J. HERBST, supra note 3, at 80-81.
278 L. TUCKER, supra note 275, at 226-27; T. CLAP, supra note 89, at 70-71; J.
HERBST, supra note 3, at 115-16.
279 R. WARCH, SCHOOL OF THE PROPHETS 25 n.44, 26-27, 31 (1973); cf. J. HERBST,
supra note 3, at 38-43, 116-17.
280 L. TUCKER, supra note 275, at 226-27; T. CLAP, supra note 89, at 74-75; J.
HERBST, supra note 3, at 115-16.
281 E. MORCAN, THE GENTLE PURITAN 299, 304-06, 319, 349-53, 357, 410, 412
(1962); J. HERBST, supra note, at 174-76.282 E. MORCAN, supra note 281, at 318-19, 419; Act of May, 1792, reprinted in THE
PUBLIC STATUTE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 694 (1808).
283 Baldwin, Zephaniah Swift, in 2 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 99 (W. Lewis ed.
1907).
284 1 Z. SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 225, 228
(Windham, Connecticut 1795).
25 E. CHEYNEY, HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1740-1940, at 104-25
(1940); H. MILLER, supra note 131, at 133; J. HERBST, supra note 3, at 178-79; Act of Nov.
27, 1779, ch. 136, 1779 Pa. Laws 271.
286 E. CHEYNEY, supra note 285, at 146-47; J. HERBST, supra note 3, at 179-82.
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supporters of the Bank of North America, whose Pennsylvania
charter had been repealed in 1784. This faction forcefully argued
that not only bank charters but also acts incorporating charitable
institutions "in consideration of money paid, or to be paid by the
contributors" were public contracts which could not be repealed
by the legislature.2 7 In 1789, the legislature restored the charters
and property of the College of Philadelphia to the deposed offi-
cials. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 confirmed the
privileges of corporate bodies219 and added a provision forbidding
the legislature to pass any law impairing contracts.2
Directed by the North Carolina Constitution to encourage
useful learning in one or more universities,191 the legislature
founded the University of North Carolina in 1789=2 and granted
it all property which had or would escheat to the state2 93 and all
lands which had been confiscated from Loyalists during the Rev-
olution and not yet sold in 1794.29 Soon the University was dom-
inated by Federalists and Presbyterians, both minorities in the
State.295 In 1800, the Republican legislature repealed the grants
of confiscated lands and escheats,190 which threatened to destroy
the school. The University's trustees challenged the legislature in
court. 2A In a broad opinion, the North Carolina high court de-
clared the repeal unconstitutional in part because it violated the
287 [p. WEBSTER], AN ESSAY ON CREDIT, IN WHICH THE DOCTRINE OF BANKS IS CON-
SIDERED, AND SOME REMARKS ARE MADE ON THE PRESENT STATE OF THE BANK OF NORTH-
AMERICA 23, 34-35 (Philadelphia 1786) (emphasis in original).
M Act of March 6, 1789, ch. 12, 1789 Pa. Laws 16.
289 PA. CONST. OF 1790, art. 8, § 3.
290 Id. art. 9, § 17.
291 N.C. CONST. of 1776, § 41.292 Act of Dee. 11, 1789, ch. 20, 1789 N.C. Sess. Laws 14. 1 K. BATTLE, HISTORY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA FROM ITS BEGINNING TO THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT
SWAIN, 1789-1868, at 1-3 (1907).
293 Act. of Nov. Sess., 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1789 N.C. Sess. Laws 16.
294 Act of July Sess., 1794, ch. 3, 1794 N.C. Sess. Laws 2.
M 1 K. BATTLE, supra note 292, at 143; D. GILPATRICK, JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY
IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1789-1816, at 129 (1931); H. MILLER, supra note 131, at 244.
M Act of Nov. Sess., 1800, ch. 5, 1800 N.C. Sess. Laws 3.
297 Trustees of the Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 59 (1805). For discussions
of the case, see Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24
HARv. L. REV. 366, 381-84 (1911); Knight, North Carolina's "Dartmouth College Case,"
19 J. HIGHER EDUC. 116 (1948). Foy was effectively overruled by University of N.C. v.
Maultsby, 43 N.C. (8 Ired. Eq.) 257 (1851).
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due process clause of the state constitution.18 Anticipating Justice
Story in Dartmouth College, the court stated that the property of
the University was as completely beyond the control of the legis-
lature as the property of individuals or that of any other corpora-
tion, even though the University was established for a public pur-
pose.m
The New Hampshire legislature's attack on Dartmouth Col-
lege in 1816 was another in the growing number of disruptive
governmental assaults on institutions of higher education.-e°
Functionally, Dartmouth had always been private, with only
limited, sporadic contact with the state. The college was estab-
lished as a result of the persistent efforts of Reverend Eleazor
Wheelock. Dartmouth received donations from many individ-
uals, of whom New Hampshire Governor John Wentworth was
merely one.- 1  Even if Wheelock was not technically the
"founder" as the Dartmouth charter stated, 302 Justice Washing-
ton was certainly correct that neither the king nor the province of
New Hampshire was the founder of Dartmouth.=
Dartmouth had little functional connection with the New
Hampshire government. The original charter had made several
provincial officials trustees in their private capacities, 314 but these
298 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) at 87-89. N.C. CONST. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights, § 10,
provided, "[t]hat no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold,
liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of
his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land." 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) at 88.
5N.C. (1 Mur.) at 88.
M In addition to those noted above, the Kentucky legislature in 1818 replaced exist-
ing trustees of Transylvania University, a majority of whom were Presbyterians, a minor-
ity sect in the state, and provided that a new board would be elected by the legislature
every two years. Perhaps because Transylvania was founded as a public institution, with
legislative control specifically reserved, the displaced trustees brought no legal challenge.
See generally N. SONNE, LIBERAL KENTUCKY, 1780-1828 (1939); J. WmRIrr, TRAN s vANIA
(1975). At the turn of the century in Virginia, the legislature remodeled Liberty Hall
Academy into the College of Washington. When the Presbyterian trustees objected, the
Virginia legislature substantially undid its reformation. See generally Hutcheson, Vir-
ginia's "Dartmouth College Case," 51 VA. MAGAZINE HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 134 (1943); 0.
CRENSHAW, GENERAL LEE'S COLLEGE 3-16, 25-31 (1969).
"01 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 665 (Story,
J., concurring).
302 Id. at 529.
33 Id. at 665.
304 Id. at 525.
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were replaced over time.-" After 1788, the Dartmouth trustees
recognized that the Governor of New Hampshire had an ex of-
ficio position on the board, but the Governor sat only occasion-
ally.3 6 Despite repeated requests,307 the New Hampshire legisla-
ture gave only sporadic assistance to Dartmouth, 38 assuming no
permanent responsibility for the welfare of the college.
When the New Hampshire legislature did assist Dartmouth,
it often did so on the assumption that it was subsidizing a legally
and functionally private institution. Grants of land in 1789 3 9 and
1807,310 and a 1795 grant of permission to sponsor a lottery,31'
made certain governmental officials ex officio members of the
Dartmouth board of trustees for the limited purpose of adminis-
tering the state grants and lottery proceeds. If the legislature
thought the college was public, subject to the full control of the
government at all times and for all purposes; such intrusions into
the Dartmouth administrative machinery for the purposes of lim-
ited regulation were awkward and unnecessary. More signif-
icantly, the limitation of the authority of the state's representa-
tives to the administration of state grants and lottery funds was
an implicit acknowledgement that in practice Dartmouth func-
tioned as an autonomous institution, with a private endowment
managed only by private trustees who did not represent the state.
Finally, although the governor occasionally sat with the Dart-
mouth board, there is no evidence that the eligible New Hamp-
shire officials sat regularly. 312 Even the limited regulatory author-
ity of the state was thus practically unexercised, and Dartmouth
operated for nearly half a century, from 1769 until 1816, with no
permanent and functional connection with the state.313
35 J. LORD, supra note 3, at 62-63, 62 n.1.
" F. CHASE, supra note 3, at 613-15.
-o7 F. STITES, supra note 3, at 7-8, 117 n.28.
I d. at 7-8, 117 nn.27-28, 118 nn.31-32.
3 Act of Feb. 5, 1789, ch. 46, reprinted in 5 LAws OF N.H. 396 (1916).
310 Act of June 18,1807, ch. 54, reprinted in 7 LAWS OF N.H. 601 (1918).
311 Act of Dec. 31,1795, ch. 26, reprinted in 6 LAWS OF N.H. 294 (1917).
312 1 L. RICHARDSON, supra note3, at 223-24.
313 When Dartmouth Professor Nathan Smith offered to donate a lot and certain
equipment if the state would appropriate money for a new medical building, the legisla-
ture appropriated the money on the condition that the lot be conveyed to the state, not
Dartmouth. Act of June 23, 1809, ch. 18, reprinted in 7 LAWS OF N.H. 813 (1918). After
the lot was conveyed, the legislature treated the lot and the building as state property. Res-
olution of Dec. 27, 1816, reprinted in 8 LAWS OF N.H. 590 (1920).
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The New Hampshire legislature's attack on Dartmouth in
1816 grew out of a quarrel between Dartmouth President John
Wheelock and the Board of Trustees. After the turn of the nine-
teenth century, and especially after 1810, the Board became in-
creasingly independent of the President, ignoring his recommen-
dations on personnel and gradually stripping him of responsibil-
ity and authority. 314 Exasperated, Wheelock took his case to the
public in a pamphlet, 315 and to the New Hampshire legislature in
a Memorial.316 In his Memorial, Wheelock accused the Trustees
of misappropriating college funds317 and of establishing a new
system at Dartmouth which would strengthen the interests of a
party or sect and would ultimately influence the government. 318
The legislature provided for a fact-finding commission,31 9 and the
Board of Trustees removed Wheelock from the Presidency of
Dartmouth. 320
The Dartmouth College controversy provided the opportu-
nity for New Hampshire's Jeffersonian-Republican party, out of
power for several years, to exploit the state's religious divisions to
regain control of the government. 321 A majority of the Dartmouth
Trustees were Federalists and associated with the Congregation-
al church, 322 which still enjoyed a quasi-established status.32 Re-
publicans, led by their noisy publicist, Isaac Hill, constructed a
coalition of Wheelock supporters, religious liberals, Baptists,
Quakers, Methodists, disgruntled Congregationalists, and other
dissenters in favor of religious liberty and against Federalist po-
litical and religious orthodoxy.3 4 Federalists, including the Dart-
314 F. SrnTES, supra note 3, at 9-11.
315 U. WHEELOCK], SKETCHES OF THE HIsToRy OF DARTMOUTH COLLECE AND
MOON'S CHARITY SCHOOL, WITH A PARTIcuLAR AccouNT OF SOME LATE REMARKABLE PRO-
CEEDINCS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, FROM THE YEAR 1779 TO THE YEAR 1815 (Newbury-
port 1815).3 16 j. WHEELOCK, MEMORIAL (1815), reprinted in J. LORD, supra note 3, at 671 app.
3 17 Id. at 672 app.
318 Id. at 673 app.
3 19 F. STITES, supra note 3, at 16-17.
320 J. LORD, supra note 3, at 75-77.
321 2 W. McLoUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT 1630-1883, at 883 (1971).
3 2 F. STITES, supra note 3, at 12.
323 2 W. McLOUGHLIN, supra note 321, at 833-93 passim; D. COLE, JACKSONIAN
DEMOCRACY IN NEw HAMPSHIRE, 1800-1851, at 29 (1970).
32 2 W. McLOUGHLIN, supra note 321, at 883, 887-93; D. COLE, supra note 323, at
29-30.
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mouth Trustees, were accused of wanting to establish a "law reli-
gion" which could perpetuate orthodoxy, while Republicans
claimed to be the party of religious toleration and universal free-
dom.32
After the Republicans won the election of 1816, they did
little immediately to disestablish the church, 32 but they did
amend the charter of Dartmouth, packing the Board of Trustees
and renaming the college "Dartmouth University." 327 The old
Trustees refused to accept the amendment 32 and commenced the
suit which finally reached the United States Supreme Court.
Once again, a state government's attack on an institution of
higher education, this time in the name of religious liberty and
for partisan political purposes, produced no direct benefit for the
institution concerned, for education generally, or for govern-
ment. The New Hampshire legislature was no more willing to
support Dartmouth University than it had been to support Dart-
mouth College. The only aid it gave the University was a loan of
four thousand dollars.32
In his opinion for the New Hampshire high court upholding
the legislative alteration of the Dartmouth charter, Chief Justice
Richardson wrote that he could not "bring himself to believe,
that it would be consistent with sound policy, or ultimately with
the true interests of literature itself, to place the great public in-
stitutions, in which all the young men, destined for the liberal
professions, are to be educated, within the absolute control of a
few individuals, and out of the control of the sovereign
power.. .. "m There were several reasons for this. Education
for the liberal professions was "too intimately connected with the
public welfare and prosperity, to be ... entrusted in the hands
of a few,"' 31 and was "worthy of the best attention of every legis-
lature."312 If trustees were made "independent," they would "ul-
325 2 W. McLoUcLmN, supra note 321, at 889.
32 Id. at 894-95.
327 Act of June 27, 1816, ch. 32, reprinted in 8 LAws OF N.H. 505 (1920); 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 539-44.
328 J. LORD, supra note 3, at 687 app.; F. STrrEs, supra note 3, at 35.
32 L. TURNER, supra note 3, at 299; J. LORD, supra note 3, at 156, 171.




timately forget that their office [was] a public trust" and would
"exercise [their powers] and to gratify their own private views
and wishes, or to promote the narrow purpose of a sect or a
party."m Moreover, since educational institutions needed legisla-
tive "aid and patronage," which in turn depended upon the
favorable estimation of the public, independent trustees who
would "dispute the public will" would provoke a long "destruc-
tive contest" in which the trustees' "triumph... might be infi-
nitely more ruinous than defeat."" Consequently, the legislature
should be able to control Dartmouth and similar educational in-
stitutions and could constitutionally amend the charter.
Before-the United States Supreme Court, Daniel Webster,
representing Dartmouth, countered Richardson's opinion. The
case, said Webster expansively, "affects not this college only, but
every college, and all the literary institutions of the country."' 3
He warned that if "these institutions [were] subject to the rise
and fall of popular parties, and the fluctuations of political opin-
ions... [c]olleges and halls [would] be deserted by all better
spirits, and become a theatre for the contention of politics. Party
and faction will be cherished in the places consecrated to piety
and learning." '
To the question really posed by Richardson and Webster,
whether "education [should be] altogether in the hands of gov-
ernment,"3 Marshall, for the Court, answered "No." His anal-
ysis leading to the conclusion that at least some colleges should
not be in the hands of government, that sound constitutional pol-
icy required protection for some colleges, was curiously general-
ized, indirect, and fragmented, almost assuming that which was
to be shown.
Marshall discussed the policy issue in two different contexts.
He assumed that private individuals using private funds to in-
struct youth were not subject to legislative control.m He then
asked in various ways whether there were any reasons why incor-
Id.
334Id. at 136-37.
m 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 598-99.336 Id.
:337 Id. at 634.
M Id. at 634-35, 636, 638.
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porated Dartmouth should be treated differently, and summarily
concluded that there were not. 9
Addressing the issue of whether Dartmouth came within the
ambit of the contracts clause, Marshall stated that the clause was
adopted "to guard against a power of at least doubtful utility, the
abuse of which had been extensively felt... [when] anterior to
the formation of the constitution, a course of legislation had pre-
vailed in many.., of the States, which weakened the confi-
dence of man in man, and embarrassed all transactions between
individuals, by dispensing with a faithful performance of en-
gagements." 40 After concluding that the Dartmouth charter was
a contract,34 Marshall stated that the charter-contract would be
within the protection of the contracts clause unless there were
good reasons for creating a "particular exception" for Dart-
mouth. 42 Searching for reasons to create such an exception,3 "
Marshall found that the framers, "feeling the necessity and pol-
icy of giving permanence and security to contracts, of withdraw-
ing them from the influence of legislative bodies, whose fluctuat-
ing policy, and repeated interferences, produced the most per-
plexing and injurious embarrassments," could not have intended
to leave contracts for the advancement of literature subject to
legislative control.43 "
Thus indirectly and obliquely, Marshall concluded on the
basis of American experience with higher education that state
legislatures' "fluctuating policy, and repeated interferences" had
"produced the most perplexing and injurious embarrassments"
for American colleges, and that sound policy required at least
"private" institutions to be given "security and permanence"
through federal constitutional protection. Although Marshall did
not argue from specific instances, his conclusion followed from
any fair reading of the American experience after about 1740,
with most of which the Court was familiar. In state after state-
in Virginia, Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, Pennsyl-
vania, North Carolina, and, of course, New Hampshire-legisla-
Id. at 634-39.340 Id. at 628.
34 Id. at 627, 643-44.
U
2 Id. at 644.




tive threats to or attacks on colleges had produced at least stagna-
tion in and often serious injury to the institutions and never any
substantial permanent gain for education or government. In
light of this record, the benign "public" to whom Chief Justice
Richardson thought colleges ought to be responsible was simply
an unreal abstraction.
The Dartmouth College decision concerned not only educa-
tional, but also religious institutions, and more particularly ed-
ucational institutions with a religious dimension. Marshall stated
that Dartmouth itself had been founded for both religious and
educational purposes345 and concluded broadly that the law of
Dartmouth College was the law of all corporations "created for
the promotion of religion," as well as for the promotion "of char-
ity or of education"' 346
Adding religion as an element complicated and refocused the
issue, but in the end reinforced the result. The problem was the
proper constitutional relationship between popularly-controlled
state governments on the one hand and religious and quasi-reli-
gious institutions on the other, where there were many religious
denominations intensely competing with one another. The his-
torical record to 1819 was dismal. Religious factionalism had
been prominent in many of the controversies between college
and state: Yale in Connecticut, the College of Philadelphia in
Pennsylvania, William and Mary in Virginia, Transylvania in
Kentucky, and the University of North Carolina. In New Hamp-
shire, Governor William Plumer, a Jeffersonian liberal, made
common cause with the most aggressive dissenting sects to effec-
tively remove Dartmouth from Congregationalist control. Once
again, in the long run history recorded no permanent gain for re-
ligion, for any particular sect, or for government from the system
which allowed denominations to compete openly and vigorously
in politics for the prize of governmentally controllable religous
and quasi-religious institutions.
Thus, on the basis of the negative historical record, the Su-
preme Court redefined the constitutional system, partially to
protect state governments from the deleterious effects of open de-
345 Id. at 633.346 Id. at 645.
[Vol. 70
THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE
nominational competition for political prizes and partially to
protect religious and quasi-religious institutions from hostile leg-
islative action. By prohibiting legislative raids on most existing
private institutions, the Court removed one of the incentives for
rival sects to enter state politics and to make religion and reli-
gious institutions subjects of partisan contention, and ensured a
measure of stability for fragile religious and quasi-religious insti-
tutions. Dartmouth College helped to channel denominational
energies out of organizing for political raids and into more pro-
ductive efforts to establish new institutions.
In short, Dartmouth College was the first great case to ad-
vance the constitutional policies assumed to underlie the first
amendment's religion clauses in the federal Bill of Rights; that is,
the separation of church and state in order to protect each from
the other. 34 7
III. PRESERVING AND USING CONSENSUS:
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, BUSINESS CORPQRATIONS,
AND RESERVATION CLAUSES
In its major constitutional cases, the Marshall Court pre-
ferred to draw upon a broad political consensus so far as possi-
ble, 34 8 and in at least some of its major decisions, the Court may
simply have judicially adopted widely-accepted principles to re-
solve the problem at hand.349 In Dartmouth College, there was
plainly no popular consensus as to the proper relationship be-
tween college and state. There was only intermittent but persis-
tently recurring political discord. The Marshall Court used its
power to settle an important and politically divisive constitution-
al issue by restricting legislative attacks on private religious,
quasi-religious and secular institutions.'
347 Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance, in 8 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298
(1973); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1947); L. TamE, AMERicAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 816-18 (1978).
348 Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall's Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REv. 893, 932-47 (1978).
'9 Id., citing as examples, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803);
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
M Nelson, supra note 348, at 944, is wrong that the Court in Dartmouth College
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However, the majority in Dartmouth College found no cause
to go further than necessary. It variously preserved and used pop-
ular consensus in dealing with municipal corporations, business
corporations, and reservation clauses in" the Dartmouth College
opinions. We now turn to these subjects.-I1
A. Municipal Corporations52
In England, municipal corporations were among the most
sacrosanct of chartered bodies, closed, propertied, privileged,
and often corrupt. 53 Although colonial America was economical-
ly, socially and politically different from the mother country, the
legal position of the municipal corporation in the two places was
similar."s
The legal position of American municipal corporations, as so
many institutions, was uncertain during the quarter-century fol-
lowing the Declaration of Independence, but after 1800 a con-
sensus emerged as to the constitutional status of governmental
corporations below the state level.ss Municipal corporations
were subject to comprehensive state legislative control, except
that legislatures could not directly seize or control corporate
property.m New Hampshire's Chief Justice Richardson empha-
sized that the legislature controlled municipal corporations,3
merely adopted a popular consensus to decide the case. It is true that Marshall rested his
opinion on widely-held principles of property and contract, but as the frequent attacks on
colleges and the opinion of the New Hampshire high court show, there was no consensus
that these principles extended to colleges. In addition, the New HampShire legislature did
not, as Nelson stated, "revoke" or "repeal" the Dartmouth charter. Id. Had the legislature
done so, Dartmouth College would have been a much easier case.
-51 The following discussions are merely summaries and are not intended to be com-
plete. Some of the propositions are in the nature of hypotheses.
352The term "municipal corporations" in the following discussion includes all gov-
ernmental corporations below the state level: cities, counties, incorporated towns, and the
like.
35See text accompanying note 58 supra.
4 J. TEAFOnD, supra note 58, at 34. Many colonial cities and towns were not incor-
porated, so, at least technically, their constitutional and legal status did not depend on the
status of corporations. Frug, supra note 12, at 1095-99.
J. TEAFORD, supra note 58, at 64-89.
• 5Id. at 80, 89-90.
3.7 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 1 N.H. at 116-17, 125-27,132-34.
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and held that Dartmouth was likewise subject to legislative con-
trol because the property of the corporation was devoted to pub-
lie uses, the trustees of the corporation were public officers, and
the public was vitally interested in the institution's operations. M
In holding that Dartmouth was a private corporation whose
charter was a constitutionally-protected contract, the United
States Supreme Court carefully distinguished publc or munic-
ipal corporations, which remained for the most part subject to
legislative control, from private corporations, which did not, in
order to answer Richardson's opinion, and, more important con-
stitutionally, in order clearly to preserve the popular consensus as
to the constitutional status of municipal corporations. Although
the Court's line between unprotected "public" and protected
"private" corporations was perhaps not as precise as might be
wished,- 9 most municipal corporations were plainly public. Pub-
lic corporations remained subject to state legislative control, °
except, Story added, as to certain corporate property interests
which the constitution would protect.-61
The Court's distinction worked. After Dartmouth College,
state legislatures controlled municipal corporations, with some
restrictions on the extent of control over corporate property.326
B. Business Corporations30
The business corporation became an essential part of the sys-
tem of political economy which developed in the four decades
following independence.- The corporation in the agrarian cap-
I d. at 117-20,125,135.
359 Frug, supra note 12, at 1101-05,
,1 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 629-30.
361 Id. at 694-95, 697-98 (Story, J., concurring).
362 J. TEAFORD, supra note 58, at 90; Frug, supra note 12, at 1104-05.
M The term "business corporation" in the foliowing discussion means a corporation
created primarily for the purpose of maldng money for its owners.
'64 The literature on early American business corporations is vast. See generally J.
BLAND , MARYLAND BusINEss CoRPoRATIONS, 1783-1852 (1934); J. CADMAN, THE CoRPO-
RATION IN NEW JERSEY (1949); J. DAvis, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CORPORATIONS (1917); E. DODD, AMERICAN BusINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MASSACHUSETTS (1954); G. EvANs, BusINESS INCORPORATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES. 1800-1943 (1948); 0. HANDLN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH
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italist economic system of the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries was used to promote economic growth by en-
couraging the formation of capital and providing financial sup-
port for the operation of the system. Thus, the most prominent
corporations were in the areas of transportation-turnpikes,
canals and river improvements, bridges-and finance-banking
and insurance.
Most internal improvement corporations were chartered in-
dividually by state legislatures. The legislature granted privileges
which entrepreneurs deemed necessary to attract investment and
imposed duties and restrictions deemed necessary to protect im-
portant public or private interests which might be damaged by
the enterprise. The whole chartering process suggested a bar-
gain, a contract, between the legislature and entrepreneurs, on
the strength of which individuals invested in the corporation.
The charters themselves were drawn as contracts, indicating the
terms of the bargains. For example, the charter of the James
River Company, which was granted by the Virginia legislature
in 1785, and which became a model for nearly all future Virginia
internal improvement charters, provided that "for and in consid-
eration of the expenses the ... proprietors will be at" in build-
ing and maintaining the canal, the "canals and works, with all
their profits" were vested in the proprietors forever and exemp-
ted from all taxationa3 The legislature was even more explicit in
its recharter of the Bank of Virginia in 1814. The preamble stated
that the "stockholders of the Bank" had "proposed for the accep-
tance of the General Assembly ... their terms and conditions of
(rev. ed. 1969); L. HARTz, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT (1948); M.
HEATH, CONSTRUCTIVE LIBERALISM (1954); J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNrTED STATES, 1780-1970 (1970); S. KUTLER, PIv-
ILEGE AND CREATIvE DESTRUCTION (1971); S. LIVERmoRE, EARLY AMERIcAN LAND Co-
PANIES (1968); R. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BusINESS CORPORATION, 1784-
1855 (1982); Baldwin, History of the Law of Private Corporations in the Colonies and
States, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANCLo-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 236 (1909); Callendar,
The Early Transportation and Banking Enterprises of the States in Relation to the Growth
of Corporations, 17 Q.J. ECON. 111 (1902); Handlin & Handlin, Origins of the American
Business Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1945); Kessler, A Statistical Study of the New
York General Incorporation Act of 1811, 48 J. POL. ECON. 877 (1940); Lively, The Amer-
ican System: A Review Article, 29 Bus. HIST. REv. 81 (1955); Williston, History of the
Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HAv. L. R~v. 105,149 (1888).
365 Act of Jan. 5,1785, Ch. 19, § 9,1784 Va. Acts 10, 11 (1785).
[Vol. 70
THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE
a mutual compact between the stockholders and the common-
wealth." The legislature "accepted" the stockholders' proposals
and went on to ratify "the compact which the... recited terms
and conditions import." The North Carolina Supreme Court
rejected a constitutional challenge to the legislature's grant of a
charter privilege to a bank:
It is not questioned that the Legislature had the power to grant
the charter to the Bank of Newbern. The object of this grant
was the public good, which the Legislature had in view on the
one hand, and the grantees had their private interest in view
on the other. To carry into effect the scheme of the bank, it be-
came necessary for the parties to enter into arrangements for
that purpose; and one part of the arrangement was, that debts
due to the bank might be recovered in a summary
way .... [Ihis privilege is not a gift, but the consideration
for it is the public good, to be derived to the citizens at large
from the establishment of the bank. It is not for this Court to
say whether the Legislature made a good or a bad bargain; it is
sufficient to see that they contracted under legitimate powers;
for over such contracts courts of justice have no control. 3 7
After about 1810, there was a broad popular consensus con-
cerning the status of business corporations. As a general rule, leg-
islatures scrupulously respected their chartered rights. With few
exceptions, most of which were under special circumstances,
none of the states seems to have arbitrarily altered substantive
chartered rights of business corporations.m As a practical matter,
if the system of political economy were to work properly, bus-
iness corporations had to survive success. Legislatures could not
attract investment into useful projects if corporate success re-
sulted in a reduction of benefits to stockholders. And where there
was a public outcry against an existing business corporation, the,
30g Act of Jan. 24, 1814, ch. 31, 1813 Va. Acts 67 (1814).
M Bank of Newbern v. Taylor, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 266, 267 (1813). In Bank of Colum-
bia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235 (1819), decided twenty days after Dartmouth Col-
lege, the United States Supreme Court stated that a charter grant of a summary remedy
for recovery of notes was not "a chartered right in the bank," but was a "remedy" subject
to legislative control. Id. at 244-45.
M B. Campbell, Law and Experience in the Early Republic 322, 324-35 (1973) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation in Michigan State University Library).
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defense, predictably, was stated in terms of respect for chartered
rights. 369
In the Dartmouth College case, both the New Hampshire
and United States high courts assumed that charters of business
corporations were constitutionally protected from arbitrary leg-
islative amendment or repeal. Chief Justice Richardson defined
chartered canal, turnpike, bridge, banking, insurance, and
manufacturing companies as "private corporations" whose
"property ... and ... profits ... in fact belongs [sic] to indi-
viduals."370 He suggested that the "property and immunities of
such corporations" should enjoy the same constitutional protec-
tions as the property and immunities of individuals.371 However,
Dartmouth was a public corporation, in a different class from
constitutionally protected private corporations.
Chief Justice Marshall did not specifically mention business
corporations, but he drew upon the popular consensus as to their
protected position in the political economy. He simply stated
without argument that the federal contracts clause extended to
charters "made on a valuable consideration . . . for the security
and disposition of property. . . on the faith of which, real and
personal estate has been conveyed to the corporation."3 2 This
plainly comprehended business corporation charters. The ques-
tion was whether, as Richardson had held, Dartmouth College
was different from business corporations; 373 Marshall held that it
was not.
Justice Story was even more explicit than Marshall. Story
stated that bank, insurance, canal, bridge and turnpike com-
panies whose stock was owned by private individuals were pri-
vate corporations.374 Again, the question was whether Dart-
mouth was likewise a protected private corporation, and Story
agreed with Marshall that it was.
The Supreme Court thus both used and preserved the pop-
369 Campbell, John Marshall, the Virginia Political Economy, and the Dartmouth
College Decision, 19 AM. J. LEGIS. HIST. 40, 58-60 (1975); L. HARTZ, supra note 364, at
236-37.
370 1 N.H. at 116.
371 Id. at 120.
372 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 644.
373 Id.
374 Id. at 669 (Story, J., concurring).
[Vol. 70
THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE
ular consensus that business corporation charters were protected
from arbitrary legislative amendment or repeal. The Court used
the consensus as a basic principle which, it concluded, should be
extended to private religious and educational corporations such
as Dartmouth. 37 Since the issue was not really the possession and
use of property as such, but rather, political control, Dartmouth
College was a tour de force, an imaginative appropriation of the
popular respect for private property and contract to the service of
diversity, institutional freedom, and civil liberty. And, of course,
as the decision rested upon the principle of respect for business
corporation charters, so Dartmouth College preserved the prin-
ciple.
C. Reservation Clauses in Corporate Charters
Reservation clauses were provisions in corporate charters re-
serving to the legislature the power to alter, amend, or repeal all
or part of the charter, either unconditionally or on the happening
of certain events. A 6 In England, the Crown regularly inserted
reservation clauses in corporate charters,1 and some American
legislatures, perhaps following England's lead, very early began
inserting reservation clauses in charters of business and other cor-
porations. In 1784, when it chartered the City of Hartford, the
Connecticut General Assembly reserved the power to alter or re-
voke the charter if any of its provisions were found to be "incon-
venient" or "inadequate. '" 378 In 1789, Connecticut became the
first state to include a general reservation clause in a business cor-
poration charter, as the legislature reserved a right to alter,
amend, or repeal the charter of the silk manufacturers of Mans-
field. 379 Thereafter, the state made extensive use of such
375 j. HERBST, supra note 3, at 234.
376 General reservation clauses reserved legislative power to alter, amend, or repeal
any section of the charter. Partial reservation clauses applied only to spe cific charter provi-
sions, such as the rates of toll. Both general and partial reservation clauses were uncondi-
tional or conditional. Unconditional reservation clauses were exercisable by the legislature
at any time. Conditional reservation clauses were operative only after the passage of time,
the receipt by the company of the original investment plus a designated percentage of
profit, or the occurrence of some other event.3
77 See text accompanying notes 52-56 supra.
378 Act of 4ay Sess., 1784,1784 Conn. Public Acts 284, 291.
379 2 J. DAvis, supra note 364, at 314-15.
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clauses,3 ° In 1789, Massachusetts became the first state to reserve
an unconditional power to regulate charges by a business corpo-
ration. - ' Many Massachusetts business corporation charters is-
sued after 1789 contained reservation clauses.3 2 New Hampshire
and Pennsylvania began using general reservation clauses after
the turn of the nineteenth century. m New York also began using
reservation clauses in non-business and business corporation
charters after the turn of the century.3 Delaware, Louisiana,
Georgia, Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Is-
land, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Vermont rarely or never
included general reservation clauses in the charters of most rel-
atively large and important enterprises. m
Reservation clauses were consistent with the prevailing as-
sumptions that corporate charters were public contracts and that
they were the measure of both corporate rights and corporate
duties and liabilities. In the chartering process, the legislature
could impose liabilities and duties, and could reserve to itself au-
thority to alter or amend the charter. The prospective corpora-
tors could refuse to accept a charter containing a reservation
clause, but if they did accept it, they accepted the risk of future
adverse legislative action. Although reservation clauses were
rarely exercised because of the adverse effect such action would
have on the attraction of capital, the clauses were taken serious-
ly. For example, when Massachusetts' Middlesex Canal corpora-
tion complained that a charter reservation allowing the legisla-
ture to regulate tolls after forty years had caused "great discour-
agements and embarrassments.., in the execution of that pro-
ject," the General Court modified the charter to guarantee a
minimum rate of toll to the corporation "forever."--, Justice Story
was a charter member of the Massachusetts General Hospital,
whose charter created a corporation to be managed by a small
380 B. Campbell, supra note 368, at 320.
381 Act of Feb. 13, 1789, § 3, 1789 Mass. Acts 773, 774.
382 B. Campbell, supra note 368, at 192-94; E. DODD, supra note 364, at 41 n.116,
213 n.73, 228-30.
3M3 B. Campbell, supra note 368, at 321.
"84 B. SEAVOY, supra note 364, at 25, 37, 51, 66.
385 Id. at 251-55, 321.
386 Act of Jan. 25,1800, ch. 3,1800 Mass. Acts 342.
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board of trustees and to be superintended by a board of visitors
composed of governmental officers.A87 The legislature reserved a
power to alter, amend or repeal the charter. However, when the
project failed to prosper, the legislature repealed the reservation
clause, restricted the superintending control of the board of vis-
itors, and otherwise limited governmental control over the insti-
tution.
The presence of reservation clauses in some corporate char-
ters and their absence from many others had important implica-
tions for the constitutional status of private corporations.-, If
charters, and through them corporations, had been subject to
general legislative control, reservation clauses would have been
legally superfluous. Selective inclusion of reservation clauses in
corporate charters makes sense legally only if the absence of a res-
ervation clause meant an absence of legislative power to alter or
amend the charter. In general, the charter was assumed to be the
measure of corporate rights against the state.
As the Supreme Court in Dartmouth College preserved the
constitutional status of municipal and business corporations, so
as a corollary it preserved the constitutional status and legal
function of reservation clauses. Marshall did not specifically
mention reservation clauses in his opinion. However, he stated
that a legislative power to amend the Dartmouth charter, "a
power which is not only not expressed, but is in direct contradic-
tion to its [the charter's] express stipulations," would not be im-
pliedA90 Had the Dartmouth charter contained a reservation
clause, Marshall was suggesting, there would have been a much
different case. And nothing in Marshall's opinion indicated that a
reservation clause would not be effective.
Justice Story was more explicit than Marshall about reserva-
tion clauses and their legal status. Story repeated the declaration
of the Massachusetts high court that "the rights legally vested in a
corporation cannot be controlled or destroyed by any subsequent
statute, unless a power for that purpose be reserved to the legisla-
387 Act of Feb. 25, 1811, ch. 94, 1811 Mass. Acts 339. See generally N. BOWDITCH, A
HISTORY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL HOSPITAL (Boston 1851).
M Act of June 14, 1813, ch. 42, 1813 Mass. Acts 266.
189 Denham, supra note 3, at 220-21.
390 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 638.
1981-82]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
ture in the act of incorporation." 391 Story stated that if the legisla-
ture wanted to claim an authority to take away or control powers
or franchises vested by the charter in a private corporation or its
officers, the legislature would have to reserve a power to do so in
the original grant.39 2
IV. SUMMARY CONCLUSION:
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE AS A CIVIL LIBERTIES CASE
Simply stated, the Dartmouth College doctrine was that the
federal contracts clause protected incorporated private religious,
quasi-religious and secular corporations from arbitrary state leg-
islative attack. The Court thus partially established for the first
time a constitutional principle of associational freedom and in-
tegrity in the context of the religiously and politically diverse and
highly competitive early nineteenth-century American society.
Inferentially, Dartmouth College extended to business corpora-
tions, but as to them the case merely adopted and actually rein-
forced the existing system of political economy. The Court's divi-
sion of corporations into public and private excluded most mu-
nicipal corporations from the reach of the Dartmouth College
doctrine, except as to certain corporate property interests. As in
the case of business corporations, so in the case of municipal cor-
porations, the Court's decision respected an existing political
consensus.
The Supreme Court reached its decision and formulated the
Dartmouth College doctrine the way it did for several reasons.
The principle basis was the negative American experience with
relations between colleges and governments from the late colon-
ial into the early national periods. In state after state, there were
* serious conflicts between colleges and governments, often caused
or exacerbated by denominational competition. These conflicts
showed no genuine permanent gain for education, religion, po-
litical parties, or government. Colleges were injured, more or less
seriously. Political governmental processes were distorted by in-
391 Id. at 708 (Story, J., concurring) (citing Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 143, 146
(1806)).
392 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 712 (Story, J., concurring).
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tensifying denominational competition. On the basis of the his-
torical record, the Supreme Court formulated the Dartmouth
College doctrine to remove private religious, quasi-religious and
secular institutions from state control for their own protection
and for the purpose of protecting democratic political processes
from the divisive and distorting effects of denominational compe-
tition. Dartmouth College thus advanced the values implicit in
the first amendment religion clauses.
The Supreme Court also believed that the Dartmouth Col-
lege doctrine would promote the voluntary private establishment
of socially beneficial institutions. Marshall firmly believed that
politically or constitutionally restricted control over private insti-
tutions would attract voluntary contributions into all sorts of so-
cially beneficial enterprises, religious or secular, charitable or
economic. In this sense, Marshall was merely appropriating for
religion and charity the political premise which underlay the
American political economy-economic growth was promoted
by free enterprise, with the state releasing private energies by
playing a.merely facilitative role. Correlatively, by restricting
the possibilities of controlling private religious and quasi-reli-
gious institutions through political action, the Court sought to
channel denominational energies into the more beneficial activ-
ity of founding new institutions.
The lessons of experience with American colleges and the po-
litical economy were reinforced by the English constitutional and
legal tradition of the private eleemosynary corporation which the
Court drew upon in formulating and justifying the Dartmouth
College doctrine. At the beginning of the seventeenth century,
the Elizabethans had created the private eleemosynary corpora-
tion-a charitable institution in which the will of the private
founder was enforced by the power of the government-deliber-
ately to promote the establishment of socially beneficial charit-
able institutions. At the end of the seventeenth century, the Eng-
lish Glorious Revolution refocused the policy basis of the private
eleemosynary corporation from promotion to political freedom,
as the privateness of charitable corporations came functionally to
mean political independence of major social institutions from di-
rect royal control. The common element in the evolution of the
English system was private property, a dynamic legal and consti-
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tutional institution which advanced both social growth and civil
liberty. The Supreme Court in Dartmouth College successfully
tapped the English tradition in the formulation and justification
of the Dartmouth College doctrine.
However, apart from drawing upon English legal terminol-
ogy and a grand English legal and constitutional tradition, the
Supreme Court did not rest its decision upon the technical Eng-
lish common law of private eleemosynary corporations. The
problem was, as Marshall well realized, that the English com-
mon law here simply did not fit the American situation. No
amount of pushing and hauling could change the fact that the
American states had nothing like the King or the royal prerog-
ative as institutions of governmental control or as threats to civil
liberty. Similarly, the laboriously constructed English jurisdic-
tional division between visitors and courts and Chancellor as
agent of the Crown rationally could provide no rule of decision in
a contest between an American state legislature and an incorpor-
ated college. Marshall honestly and wisely stayed as far as pos-
sible from these technical matters. Story's opinion, so far as it
purported to rest upon the technical English common law, either
distorted the law or misapplied it by ignoring fundamental dif-
ferences between the English and American constitutional and
legal systems.
Dartmouth College was the Supreme Court's first great civil
liberties case. The Court erected at least partial constitutional
protection for religious, quasi-religious and secular institutions
from predatory majoritarian coalitions acting through state legis-
latures. The Court, moreover, acted in a thoroughly activist
fashion, liberally construing an opaque constitutional guarantee
in a fashion which even Marshall admitted was not specifically
intended by either the founding fathers or the American
people.193 Both in style and substance, the Marshall Court in
Dartmouth College anticipated and provided historical prece-
dent for many of the great activist civil liberties decisions of the
twentieth century.
393 Id. at 644.
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